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Summary 
In May 2012, Canadian pipeline company TransCanada reapplied to the U.S. Department of State 
for a Presidential Permit to build the Keystone XL pipeline. The pipeline would transport crude 
oil from the oil sands region of Alberta, Canada, to the existing Keystone Pipeline System in 
Nebraska. It also could accept U.S. crude from the Bakken oil fields in Montana and North 
Dakota. A second segment of the Keystone XL pipeline system, the Gulf Coast Project, is 
proceeding separately to connect existing pipeline facilities in Oklahoma to refineries in Texas. 
When completed, the entire Keystone XL pipeline system would ultimately have capacity to 
transport 830,000 barrels of crude oil per day to U.S. market hubs. TransCanada submitted the 
May 2012 permit application after its 2008 Keystone XL permit application was denied. 
The State Department has jurisdiction over the Keystone XL pipeline’s approval because it would 
cross the U.S. border. Before it can approve such a permit, the department must determine that the 
project is in the “national interest,” accounting for potential effects on the environment, economy, 
energy security, and foreign policy, among other factors. Environmental impacts are considered 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, as documented in an Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS). For the 2008 permit application, a final EIS was issued in August 2011, followed 
by a public review period. Largely in response to public comments and efforts by the state of 
Nebraska, the State Department determined that it needed to examine alternative pipeline routes 
that would avoid the environmentally sensitive Sand Hills region of Nebraska, a sand dune 
formation with highly porous soil and shallow groundwater that recharges the Ogallala aquifer.  
The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78) required the Secretary of 
State to approve or deny the original 2008 project application within 60 days. On January 18, 
2012, citing insufficient time under this deadline to properly assess the reconfigured project, the 
State Department denied the Keystone XL permit. Since then, TransCanada has worked with 
Nebraska officials to identify a pipeline route avoiding the Sand Hills. Its May 2012 permit 
application reflects that effort. The State Department has begun the NEPA process anew, but will 
largely supplement the August 2011 final EIS to include analysis of the new route in Nebraska, as 
well as analysis of any significant environmental issues or information that has become available 
since August 2011. The department estimates that it will determine whether to approve or deny 
the new Presidential Permit by early 2013. 
The 112th Congress debated numerous legislative options addressing the Keystone XL pipeline. 
The North American Energy Access Act (H.R. 3548) would have transferred permitting authority 
for the Keystone XL pipeline project to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, requiring 
issuance of a permit within 30 days of enactment. Several other bills (H.R. 3811, H.R. 4000, H.R. 
4301, S. 2041, and S. 2199) would have approved immediately the 2008 permit application filed 
by TransCanada. A House bill (H.R. 6164), the Domestic Energy and Jobs Act (S. 3445), and 
S.Amdt. 2789 would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement for the reconfigured 
Keystone XL pipeline as proposed in TransCanada’s permit application filed on May 4, 2012. S. 
2100 and H.R. 4211 would have suspended sales of petroleum products from the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve until issuance of a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL project. H.R. 3900 
sought to ensure that crude oil transported by the Keystone XL pipeline, or resulting refined 
petroleum products, would be sold only into U.S. markets. To date, no Keystone XL legislation 
has been proposed in the 113th Congress but the issues surrounding the Presidential Permit remain 
largely the same. 
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Introduction1 
In September 2008, TransCanada (a Canadian company) applied to the U.S. Department of State 
for a permit to cross the U.S.-Canada international border with the Keystone XL pipeline project. 
As originally proposed, the pipeline would carry crude oil produced from the oil sands region of 
Alberta, Canada, to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries. Because the pipeline would connect the United 
States with a foreign country, it requires a Presidential Permit issued by the State Department. 
Issuance of a Presidential Permit requires a finding that the project is in the “national interest.”  
Over the course of gathering information necessary to make its national interest determination, 
the State Department sought comments from the public as well as local, state, tribal, and federal 
agencies. The department received comments on a wide range of issues, including beneficial and 
adverse impacts of the proposed project on jobs, pipeline safety, and the environment. According 
to the State Department, one of the most common issues raised related to the pipeline’s proposed 
route through the Sand Hills region of Nebraska. Also according to the State Department, concern 
over the proposed route’s impact on the Sand Hills region had increased significantly over time. 
In response to those concerns, as well as action taken by Nebraska’s Governor and legislature, on 
November 10, 2011, the department announced that it needed to undertake an in-depth 
assessment of alternative pipeline routes that would avoid the Sand Hills.2 That assessment would 
be necessary before it could complete its National Interest Determination for the Presidential 
Permit. Subsequently, on November 14, 2011, TransCanada announced an agreement with the 
Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality to identify a pipeline route that would avoid the 
Sand Hills. The State Department estimated at the time that the preparation of supplemental 
environmental analysis necessary for a new route alternative could be complete in early 2013. 
After the State Department’s announcement of a delay in the permit review, Congress acted to 
expedite a permit decision on the Keystone XL project. The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut 
Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78), enacted on December 23, 2011, included provisions 
requiring the Secretary of State to issue a permit for the project within 60 days, unless the 
President publicly determined the project not to be in the national interest. The act allowed for 
future changes to the Nebraska route if approved by the governor of Nebraska. On January 18, 
2012, the State Department, with the President’s consent, denied the Keystone XL permit, citing 
insufficient time under the 60-day deadline to obtain all the necessary information to assess the 
reconfigured project.3  
On February 27, 2012, TransCanada announced that it would proceed with development of the 
Gulf Coast Project, a pipeline segment connecting Cushing, OK, to the Gulf Coast refineries, 
                                                 
1 This report provides an overview of the Keystone XL project, permit review process, and general policy issues. For 
more detailed legal analysis, see CRS Report R42124, Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues, by Adam Vann, 
Kristina Alexander, and Kenneth R. Thomas. For more analysis of U.S.-Canada energy trade, see CRS Report R41875, 
The U.S.-Canada Energy Relationship: Joined at the Well, by Paul W. Parfomak and Michael Ratner. For additional 
environmental analysis associated with Canadian oil sands, see CRS Report R42537, Canadian Oil Sands: Life-Cycle 
Assessments of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Richard K. Lattanzio. 
2 U.S. Department of State, “Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional Information,” 
November 10, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176964.htm.  
3 U.S. Department of State, “Briefing on the Keystone XL Pipeline,” briefing transcript, January 18, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/181492.htm. 
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originally proposed as part of the Keystone XL pipeline system subject to a Presidential Permit.4 
Its construction and operation may proceed in accordance with applicable regulatory 
requirements. However, as a pipeline located entirely within the United States, it does not require 
a Presidential Permit from the Department of State. The Obama Administration has stated its 
support for the Gulf Coast project, while reserving judgment on the reconfigured northern 
segment of the Keystone XL project until completion of a new Presidential Permit review.5 On 
May 4, 2012, the State Department received a new application from TransCanada for a 
reconfigured Keystone XL pipeline that would run from the Canadian border to connect to an 
existing pipeline in Steele City, NE.6 The new application identified proposed new routes through 
Nebraska. On September 5, 2012, TransCanada submitted to the Nebraska Department of 
Environmental Quality its preferred alternative route for the Keystone XL Pipeline in Nebraska.7 
The Governor of Nebraska approved a new route through the state on January 22, 2013.8 
Some Members of Congress have expressed support for the Keystone XL pipeline’s potential 
energy security and economic benefits, while others have expressed reservations about its 
potential environmental impacts.9 Though Congress, to date, has had no direct role in permitting 
the pipeline’s construction, it may have an oversight role stemming from federal environmental 
statutes that govern the pipeline’s application review process. Congress also may seek to 
influence the State Department permitting process, or may seek to assert direct congressional 
authority over permit approval, through new legislation. 
In the 112th Congress, a number of legislative proposals, like P.L. 112-78, would have imposed 
deadlines on a national interest determination for the Keystone XL project. The North American-
Made Energy Security Act (H.R. 1938) would have directed the President to issue a final order 
granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline by November 1, 2011. 
The Jobs Through Growth Act (H.R. 3400) would have required the President to issue a final 
order granting or denying the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline within 30 days of 
enactment. The North American Energy Security Act (S. 1932) would have required the Secretary 
of State to issue a permit for the project within 60 days of enactment, unless the President 
publicly determined the project to be not in the national interest. The North American Energy 
Security Act (H.R. 3537) and the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011 (H.R. 
3630) contained similar provisions for issuing a Presidential Permit within 60 days of enactment. 
All of these proposals were mooted by the State Department’s initial denial of the permit. 
                                                 
4 TransCanada Corp., “TransCanada Set to Re-Apply for Keystone XL Permit Proceeding with Gulf Coast Project,” 
press release, February 27, 2012. 
5 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the Press Secretary,” press release, February 27, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/27/statement-press-secretary. 
6 See the State Department’s “New Keystone XL Pipeline Project” webpage at http://www.keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/. 
7 TransCanada Corp., “TransCanada Listens to Nebraskans: Updated Keystone XL Nebraska Re-route Reflects Their 
Feedback,” press release, September 5, 2012. 
8 Dave Heineman, Governor of Nebraska, letter to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, January 22, 2013, 
http://www.governor.nebraska.gov/news/2013/01/docs/0122_Pipeline_Approval.pdf. 
9 See, for example, Matthew Daly, “53 Senators Urge Approval of Keystone XL Pipeline,” Associated Press, January 
23, 2013; Juliet Eilperin, “Democratic Lawmakers Pressure Obama Administration on Both Sides of Keystone Pipeline 
Issue,” Washington Post, October 19, 2011; House Energy & Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and 
Power, Hearing on The American Energy Initiative, Discussion Draft of H.R. ____, the North American Made Energy 
Security Act of 2011, May 23, 2011; U.S. Senator Charles Grassley, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, May 16, 2011; U.S. Senator Max Baucus, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, September 10, 
2010; U.S. Representative Henry A. Waxman, Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, July 2, 2010. 
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Additional legislative proposals followed TransCanada’s new permit application. The North 
American Energy Access Act (H.R. 3548) would have transferred the permitting authority over 
the Keystone XL pipeline project from the State Department to the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), requiring the commission to issue a permit for the project within 30 days of 
enactment. The Keystone For a Secure Tomorrow Act (H.R. 3811) would have immediately 
approved the original permit application filed by TransCanada in 2008. The Grow America Act of 
2012 (S. 2199), the EXPAND Act (H.R. 4301), S. 2041 (a bill to approve the Keystone XL 
pipeline), and the Energizing America through Employment Act (H.R. 4000), would have 
similarly approved the original permit upon passage. All six bills included provisions allowing for 
later alteration of the pipeline route in Nebraska. A House bill (H.R. 6164) and The Domestic 
Energy and Jobs Act (S. 3445) both would have eliminated the Presidential Permit requirement 
for the reconfigured Keystone XL pipeline as proposed in TransCanada’s permit application filed 
on May 4, 2012. A Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 2789) contained the same language.10 
H.R. 3900 sought to ensure that any crude oil transported by the Keystone XL pipeline, or 
resulting refined petroleum products, would be sold only into U.S. markets—not exported 
overseas. S. 2100 and H.R. 4211 would have suspended sales of petroleum products from the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve until issuance of a Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL project 
application filed in 2008. To date, no Keystone XL legislation has been proposed in the 113th 
Congress but the issues surrounding the Presidential Permit remain largely the same. 
This report describes the Keystone XL pipeline project, as proposed by TransCanada in its May 4, 
2012, Presidential Permit application, and the process that the State Department is obligated to 
complete in processing that permit application. It also summarizes issues that arose during the 
2008 permit application process, particularly those that may affect the current permit application. 
This report also summarizes key arguments that have been raised, both for and against the 
pipeline, by the pipeline’s developers, state and federal agencies, environmental groups, and other 
stakeholders. Finally, the report reviews the constitutional basis for the State Department’s 
authority to issue a Presidential Permit, and opponents’ possible challenges to this authority. 
Description of the Keystone Pipeline System 
In 2005, TransCanada announced its plan to address expected increases in Western Canadian 
Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) production by constructing the Keystone Pipeline System. When 
complete, the system would transport crude oil from Hardisty, Alberta, to U.S markets in the 
Midwest and Gulf Coast.  
The pipeline system was proposed as two segments, the Keystone (complete and in service) and 
Keystone XL. The Keystone was completed in two phases—the Keystone Mainline and the 
Cushing Extension. The Mainline is 1,353 miles of 30-inch pipeline from Hardisty, Alberta, to the 
United States refineries in Wood River and Patoka, IL. The U.S. portion of the pipeline runs 
1,086 miles and begins at the international border in Cavalier County, ND, and has been in 
service since June 2010. The Cushing Extension is 298 miles of 36-inch pipeline and associated 
facilities that run from Steele City, NE (near the Kansas border) to existing crude oil terminals 
and tanks farms in Cushing, OK. The Cushing Extension has been in service since February 2011. 
                                                 
10 S.Amdt. 2789 would have amended the Veterans Jobs Corps Act of 2012 (S. 3429). 
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Keystone XL Pipeline Segments  
As proposed in 2008, the Keystone XL pipeline was also to be completed in two phases. As 
currently planned, those phases would be constructed as follows: 
• The Gulf Coast Project, 435 miles of 36-inch pipeline and associated facilities 
linking the Cushing tank farms to refineries in Houston and Port Arthur, TX. This 
segment includes the Cushing Marketlink project that will provide receipt 
facilities to transport U.S. crude oil to the Gulf Coast. TransCanada anticipates 
this segment to be in service mid-to-late 2013. 
• The Keystone XL, 1,179 miles of 36-inch pipeline and associated facilities 
linking Hardisty to Steele City. This segment includes the Bakken Marketlink 
Project that would provide receipt facilities in Baker, MT, for crude oil from the 
Williston Basin producing region for delivery to Steele City then Gulf Coast 
refineries. TransCanada expects this segment to be in service late 2015.  
The Keystone Pipeline System, with both the completed Keystone and proposed segments of the 
Keystone XL, is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The TransCanada Keystone Pipeline System: Keystone and Keystone XL  
 
 Source: TransCanada, provided to CRS on May 23, 2012. 
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TransCanada reports that the Keystone pipeline (the Mainline and Cushing Extension) has the 
capacity to deliver 591,000 barrels per day (bpd). TransCanada anticipates that the future addition 
of the Keystone XL pipeline (the Keystone XL and Gulf Coast Project) will have an initial 
capacity of 700,000 bpd and a potential capacity of 830,000 bpd. As a result, the entire Keystone 
Pipeline System may ultimately have a capacity of 1.3 million bpd.11 
TransCanada originally estimated the capital cost of the U.S. portion of the Keystone XL pipeline 
project, from the U.S. Canada border to Steele City, NE, to be $5.3 billion.12 This figure was 
higher than the cost estimate when the initial permit application was filed, reportedly due to 
currency swings, changing regulatory requirements, and permitting delays.13 The new route 
would presumably be longer and cost more, but specific cost estimates for the reconfigured 
Keystone XL project in its entirety are not publicly available and, in any case, would still depend 
on the selection of a final route through Nebraska.  
The Bakken Marketlink  
The Bakken Formation is a large unconventional petroleum and natural gas resource underlying 
parts of North Dakota, Montana, and the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. 
Although the region has been producing since 1951, it is only since 2006 that prices and 
technology have made it economic for industry to increase production. In March 2012, Bakken 
production reached a new high of over 510,000 bpd, the first time breaking 500,000 bpd.14 In late 
2011, Bakken oil production in North Dakota exceeded 500,000 bpd. Depending on the pace of 
well development in the region, production is expected to increase steadily.15 To date, 
infrastructure to transport oil produced from the Bakken Formation has not kept up with the 
increased production. Bakken shale crude oil is transported to refineries by rail and truck, rather 
than the more economical pipeline. (For more analysis, see CRS Report R42032, The Bakken 
Formation: Leading Unconventional Oil Development, by Michael Ratner et al.) 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the proposed Keystone XL pipeline would include receipt facilities to 
transport crude produced from Williston Basin in North Dakota and Montana to Gulf Coast 
refineries That project, the Bakken Marketlink, would include facilities to provide crude oil 
transportation service from Baker, MT, to Cushing, OK, via the proposed Keystone XL pipeline 
and from Cushing to delivery points in Texas, via the proposed Gulf Coast Project.16 Keystone 
Marketlink17 estimates that the project will cost $140 million and have the ability to deliver 
                                                 
11 Based on information provided by TransCanada to the Congressional Research Service (at the request of CRS) on 
May 23, 2012. 
12 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., “Application of TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. for a Presidential Permit 
Authorizing the Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Pipeline Facilities for the Importation of Crude Oil to be 
Located at the United States-Canada Border,” submitted to the U.S. Department of State, May 4, 2012, p. 39, available 
at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/proj_docs/permitapplication/index.htm. 
13 “TransCanada Expects $1-Billion Cost Escalation for Keystone XL Pipeline,” Canadian Press, February 17, 2011. 
14 North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, “North Dakota Monthly Oil Production Statistics,” Bismarck, ND, 
2011, p. 14, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicaloilprodstats.pdf. 
15 James Mason, Oil and Gas Journal, “Bakken’s Maximum Potential Oil Production Rate Explored,” April 2, 2012. 
16 The Bakken Marketlink project is described in the August 2011 final EIS for the 2008 Presidential Permit application 
in Section 2.5.3, available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/182012.pdf. 
17 Keystone Marketlink, LLC, is a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada Pipelines Limited. 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 6 
approximately 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day to the proposed Keystone XL pipeline.18 After 
a successful Open Season in late 2010, Keystone Marketlink obtained sufficient commitments to 
proceed with the project.19 On August 15, 2011, Keystone Marketlink initiated a second binding 
Open Season to obtain additional firm commitments from interested parties for the planned 
project.20 
These new Bakken contracts improve the economics for Keystone XL, raising the amount of oil 
slated to flow through the pipeline.21 Lower transportation costs and access to new markets may 
support further investment in the Bakken. Furthermore, TransCanada is not the only company 
adding pipeline capacity in the region. Notably, Enbridge, another Canadian pipeline company, 
has proposed the Bakken Pipeline Project, which would add 120,000 bpd of transport capacity to 
move Bakken oil to Midwest markets.22 According to Enbridge, sufficient pipeline capacity has 
been slow to emerge in the region because “they’re smaller players in the Bakken. They are not 
able to make the 20-year commitments and it’s been a lot of work to get them to commit to the 
level that [is] required to underwrite a major project out of the Bakken.”23 Rail transport capacity 
is also expanding.24 
Presidential Permit Application Requirements 
Ordinarily, federal agencies have no authority to site oil pipelines, even interstate pipelines.25 The 
primary siting authority for oil pipelines generally would be established under applicable state 
law (which may vary considerably from state to state). However, the construction, connection, 
operation, and maintenance of a pipeline that connects the United States with a foreign country 
requires executive permission conveyed through a Presidential Permit. Since the Keystone and 
proposed Keystone XL pipelines are designed for the importation of oil from Canada, their 
facilities require a Presidential Permit. 
Executive Order 13337 delegates to the Secretary of State the President’s authority to receive 
applications for Presidential Permits.26 Issuance of a Presidential Permit is dependant upon a 
finding that the project would serve the “national interest.” In the course of making that 
determination, the State Department is obligated to consider a host of issues related to the 
                                                 
18 TransCanada, “TransCanada to Transport U.S. Crude Oil to Market Bakken Open Season a Success,” press release, 
January 11, 2011, http://www.transcanada.com/5631.html. 
19 Jeffrey Jones, “TransCanada Plans U.S. Bakken Pipeline Link,” Reuters, January 20, 2011. 
20 TransCanada, “TransCanada Announces Additional Commitments to Keystone XL Following Successful Open 
Season,” December 15, 2011, http://www.transcanada.com/5907.html. 
21 Vanderklippe, 2011. 
22 Enbridge, “Bakken Pipeline Project—Project Overview,” press release, http://www.enbridge.com/
BakkenPipelineProjects/BakkenPipelineProjectUS.aspx. 
23 Lauren Krugel, “TransCanada attracts support for Montana-to-Oklahoma crude pipeline,” The Canadian Press, 
January 20, 2011. 
24 Selam Gebrekidan, “Bakken Rail Terminal Ships First Crude Cargo-Lario,” Reuters, November 9, 2011. 
25 This is in contrast to interstate natural gas pipelines, which, under Section 7(c) (15 USC §717f(c)) of the Natural Gas 
Act, must obtain a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  
26 See Executive Order 13337, “Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land 
Transportation Crossings on the International Boundaries of the United States,” 69 Federal Register 25299, May 5, 
2004, as amended, and Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 118-2 of January 26, 2006. The source of 
Permitting Authority for relevant Executive Orders is discussed further in the Appendix A. 
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proposed project. The State Department will not necessarily evaluate the same factors for each 
project seeking a permit. However, the State Department identified the following as key factors it 
considered in making previous national interest determinations for pipeline permit applications: 
• Environmental impacts of the proposed projects; 
• Impacts of the proposed projects on the diversity of supply to meet U.S. crude oil 
demand and energy needs; 
• The security of transport pathways for crude oil supplies to the United States 
through import facilities constructed at the border relative to other modes of 
transport; 
• Stability of trading partners from whom the United States obtains crude oil; 
• Relationship between the United States and various foreign suppliers of crude oil 
and the ability of the United States to work with those countries to meet overall 
environmental and energy security goals; 
• Impact of proposed projects on broader foreign policy objectives, including a 
comprehensive strategy to address climate change; 
• Economic benefits to the United States of constructing and operating proposed 
projects; and 
• Relationships between proposed projects and goals to reduce reliance on fossil 
fuels and to increase use of alternative and renewable energy sources.27 
In making its national interest determination, the State Department is required to consult with 
relevant federal and state agencies and to invite public comment in arriving at its determination. 
However, the State Department has broad discretion in determining what factors it will examine 
to inform its determination and, ultimately, whether a proposed project is in the national interest. 
Documenting Environmental Impacts Under NEPA 
As identified on the list above, a proposed project’s environmental impact is one factor 
considered by the State Department in making its national interest determination, documented 
within the context of preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), pursuant to the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.).28 Broadly, NEPA requires 
federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their actions before proceeding with 
them and to inform the public of those potential impacts. To ensure that environmental impacts 
are considered, an EIS must be prepared for major federal actions “significantly” affecting the 
                                                 
27 This list was included in the State Department’s Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone Xl Project 
under a discussion regarding the Presidential Permit Review Process (p. 1-4). It was noted that this list is not 
exhaustive, and that the State Department may consider additional factors in its national interest determination process. 
28 In processing Presidential Permit applications, the State Department is also explicitly directed to review the project’s 
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. §470f), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 
§1531 et seq.), and Executive Order 12898 of February 11, 1994 (59 Federal Register 7629), concerning environmental 
justice. In processing the permit application for the Keystone XL Pipeline project, issues associated with NEPA 
compliance have drawn the most attention. In large part, that is likely because it is during the NEPA process that 
compliance with these, as well as any other environmental requirements, would be identified, documented, and 
demonstrated.  
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environment.29 With respect to the 2008 Presidential Permit application submitted by 
TransCanada, the State Department concluded that issuance of a permit for the proposed 
construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of the Keystone XL Pipeline and its 
associated facilities at the United States border would constitute a major federal action that may 
have a significant impact upon the environment within the meaning of NEPA.30 For this reason, 
the State Department prepared an EIS to address reasonably foreseeable impacts from the 
proposed action and alternatives. Similarly, an EIS will have to be completed for the reconfigured 
Keystone XL project under the May 4, 2012, permit application. 
Overview of the Process for the 2008 Keystone XL Pipeline Project 
Among other requirements, an EIS must include a statement of the purpose and need for an 
action, a description of all reasonable alternatives to meet that purpose and need, a description of 
the environment to be affected by those alternatives, and an analysis of the direct and indirect 
effects of the alternatives, including cumulative impacts.31 Accordingly, the State Department EIS 
must demonstrate the review and consider potential environmental impacts of the entire pipeline 
(including the construction, operation, and maintenance of the pipeline and its associated 
facilities), not just the facilities at the border crossing. 
As the NEPA compliance process for TransCanada’s permit application has proceeded, it is 
important to understand the distinction between what is required under NEPA itself and what may 
be required pursuant to other environmental requirements identified within the context of the 
NEPA process. NEPA itself requires federal agencies to identify the environmental impacts of an 
action before proceeding with them and to involve the public in that process when environmental 
impacts are significant. In that process of identifying a proposed project’s environmental impacts, 
within the context of preparing the EIS, the lead agency should identify any compliance 
obligations (licenses, permits, or approvals) established under additional state, tribal, and federal 
law applicable to the portion of the project constructed in the United States (see “State Siting and 
Additional Environmental Requirements,” below).  
EIS preparation is done in two stages, resulting in a draft and final EIS. NEPA regulations require 
the draft EIS to be circulated for public and agency comment, followed by a final EIS that 
incorporates those comments.32 Preparing the EIS is the responsibility of a designated “lead 
agency,” in this case, the State Department. In developing the EIS, the State Department must rely 
to some extent on information provided by TransCanada. For example, TransCanada’s original 
permit application included an Environmental Report which was intended to provide the State 
                                                 
29 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C). 
30 U.S. Department of State, “Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and to Conduct Scoping 
Meetings and Notice of Floodplain and Wetland Involvement and to Initiate Consultation under Section 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act for the Proposed TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline,” 74 Federal Register 5020, 
January 28, 2009. 
31 In preparing an EIS associated with a Presidential Permit, NEPA regulations promulgated by both the Council of 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the State Department would apply. CEQ regulations implementing NEPA (under 40 
C.F.R. §§1500-1508) apply to all federal agencies. NEPA regulations applicable to State Department actions, which 
supplement the CEQ regulations, are found at 22 C.F.R. §161. 
32 For more analysis of NEPA requirements, see CRS Report RL33152, The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA): Background and Implementation, by Linda Luther. 
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Department with sufficient information to understand the scope of potential environmental 
impacts of the project.33  
In preparing the draft EIS, the lead agency must request input from “cooperating agencies,” 
which include any agency with jurisdiction by law or with special expertise regarding any 
environmental impact associated with the project.34 Cooperating agencies for the Keystone XL 
project (for the pipeline’s first Presidential Permit application) were the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA), Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS); the Department of the 
Interior’s Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park 
Service; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service 
Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Rural Utilities Service; the Department of 
Energy’s Western Area Power Administration; and state environmental agencies.  
In addition to its role as a cooperating agency, EPA is also required to review and comment 
publicly on the EIS and rate both the adequacy of the EIS itself and the level of environmental 
impact of the proposed project.35 Rating the EIS takes place after the draft is issued. The EIS 
could be rated either “Adequate,” “Insufficient Information,” or “Inadequate.” EPA’s rating of a 
project’s environmental impacts may range from “Lack of Objections” to “Environmentally 
Unsatisfactory.” In rating the impact of the action itself, EPA would specify one of the following: 
“Lack of Objections,” “Environmental Concerns,” “Environmental Objections,” or 
“Environmentally Unsatisfactory.” The federal agency would then be required to respond to 
EPA’s rating, as appropriate. EPA’s role in rating draft EISs had a significant impact on the NEPA 
process for TransCanada’s 2008 Presidential Permit application.  
Major milestones in that NEPA process are listed in Table 1, below (for more detail on the 
milestones listed, see Appendix B). 
                                                 
33 Documents submitted for the initial 2008 Presidential Permit application have now been archived by the State 
Department. Documents related to that original application are available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/archive/ 
index.htm. 
34 40 C.F.R. §1508.5. Also, Executive Order 13337 directs the Secretary of State to refer an application for a 
Presidential Permit to other specifically identified federal departments and agencies on whether granting the application 
would be in the national interest. 
35 For more information, see the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s “Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
Rating System Criteria” at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/comments/ratings.html. 
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Table 1. Milestones in the NEPA process for the 2008 Keystone XL Pipeline 
Administrative, Congressional, State, and Company Actions That Affected the NEPA Process and National 
Interest Determination 
Date Party Description 
Sept. 
2008 
TransCanada An application for a Presidential Permit is filed with the State Department to 
build and operate the Keystone XL Project; a “Preliminary Environmental 
Report” for the project is also submitted. 
Apr. 16, 
2010 
State 
Department 
Draft EIS for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project is released for public 
comment. 
July 16, 
2010 
EPA The agency rates the draft EIS as “Inadequate,” noting that potentially significant 
impacts were not evaluated, that the additional information and analysis was 
needed, and that the draft EIS would need to be formally revised and again made 
available for public review. 
Oct. 21, 
2010 
State 
Department 
Secretary Clinton states that the State Department was “inclined to” approve 
the project. Critics of the project, including some Members of Congress, stated 
that the Secretary’s statement appeared to prejudge its permit approval for the 
pipeline proposal as a foregone conclusion. 
Apr. 15, 
2011 
State 
Department 
Supplemental draft EIS issued. 
June 6, 
2011 
EPA The agency rates the supplemental draft EIS as having “Insufficient Information” 
and the action as having “Environmental Objections.” EPA recommends 
additional analysis on a range of issues. 
Aug. 26, 
2011 
State 
Department 
Final EIS issued. 
Source: The Congressional Research Service, based on a review of events during, and affecting, the NEPA 
process conducted for the 2008 Presidential permit application for the Keystone XL pipeline project. 
The National Interest Determination for a Presidential Permit 
Generally, after a final EIS is issued, a federal agency may issue a final record of decision (ROD) 
for the project. However, for a Presidential Permit, issuance of the final EIS represents the 
beginning of a 90-day public review period during which the State Department gathers 
information from necessary to inform its national interest determinations. Ultimately, a decision 
regarding issuance of a Presidential Permit for a pipeline project would be reflected in a 
combined “Record of Decision and National Interest Determination,” issued by the State 
Department.36 That document, required under elements of both NEPA and E.O. 11424, formalizes 
the selection of a project alternative. 
The process of determining a project’s national interest illustrates the distinctly different, yet 
interrelated requirements applicable to the NEPA process and the Presidential Permit application 
process. Under NEPA, the State Department (or any other federal agency considering an action) 
must fully assess the environmental consequences of an action and potential project alternatives 
before making a final decision. NEPA does not prohibit a federal action that has adverse 
environment impacts; it requires only that a federal agency be fully aware of and consider those 
                                                 
36 For example, see U.S. Department of State, Record of Decision and National Interest Determination, TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline, LP Application for Presidential Permit, February 25, 2008, http://www.cardnoentrix.com/keystone/
project/SignedROD.pdf. 
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adverse impacts before selecting a final project alternative. That is, NEPA is intended to be part of 
the decision-making process, not dictate a particular outcome. By contrast, issuance of a 
Presidential Permit is predicated on the Secretary of State finding that the proposed project would 
serve the national interest. While NEPA does not prohibit federal actions with adverse 
environmental impacts, a project’s adverse environmental impacts (as well as other factors) may 
lead the State Department to determine that it is not in the national interest.  
Overview of the Process for the 2008 Keystone XL Pipeline Project 
During the 90-day public review period for the initial Keystone XL pipeline permit, the State 
Department held public meetings in each of the six states through which the proposed pipeline 
would pass and in Washington, DC.37 The meetings were intended to give members of the public 
additional opportunity to voice their opinions on issues they thought should be taken into account 
in determining whether granting or denying the Presidential Permit would be in the national 
interest. During the review period, the State Department received input from state, local, and 
tribal officials as well as members of the public. 
On November 10, 2011, during the public review period, the State Department issued a statement 
regarding the public comments and its response to those comments.38 The department stated that 
it received comments on a wide range of issues including the project’s potential impact on jobs, 
pipeline safety, health concerns, the societal impact of the project, and oil extraction in Canada. 
Concern regarding the proposed pipeline route through the Sand Hills area of Nebraska was 
identified as one of the most common issues raised. Comments regarding that pipeline route were 
consistent with the environmental impacts identified in the final EIS with regard to the unique 
combination of characteristics of the Sand Hills region (e.g., a high concentration of wetlands of 
special concern, a sensitive ecosystem, and extensive areas of very shallow groundwater). 
Further, the Nebraska legislature convened a special session to consider the legislation that would 
establish regulations applicable to pipeline siting within the state.  
Facing the prospect of new state pipeline siting regulations applicable to the Sand Hills, together 
with the concern about the Keystone XL pipeline’s specific “preferred” route, the State 
Department announced that it needed additional information about alternative pipeline routes 
avoiding the environmentally sensitive Sand Hills area in Nebraska before moving forward with 
its national interest determination.39 Although the State Department did not decide that 
environmental issues led to a determination that the proposed project was not in the national 
interest, environmental issues identified in the final EIS, and further stressed in public comments, 
led to its decision to delay that determination until it gathered this information. In a concurrent 
press release, President Obama stated 
Because this permit decision could affect the health and safety of the American people as 
well as the environment, and because a number of concerns have been raised through a 
                                                 
37 U.S. Department of State press release, “Keystone XL Final Environmental Impact Statement Released; Public 
Meetings Set,” August 26, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/171082.htm. 
38 U.S. Department of State, “Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional 
Information,” Media Note, PRN 2011/1909, Office of the Spokesperson, November 10, 2011. 
39 U.S. Department of State, November 10, 2011, see footnote 38. 
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public process, we should take the time to ensure that all questions are properly addressed 
and all the potential impacts are properly understood.40 
Subsequently, TransCanada announced that it would work with the State Department and the 
Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to conduct an environmental assessment 
to define the best location for the Keystone XL pipeline in Nebraska. Further, the company stated 
that it would “cooperate with these agencies and provide them with the information they need to 
complete a thorough review that addresses concerns regarding the Sandhills region.”41 
Although no new decision deadline was established, State Department officials suggested that it 
would be “reasonable to expect that this process including a public comment period on a 
supplement to the final EIS consistent with NEPA could be completed as early as the first quarter 
of 2013.”42 The State Department has subsequently stated that it did not anticipate concluding the 
federal review process before the end the first quarter of 2013.43 In a 2011 press interview, 
President Obama also appeared to suggest that, notwithstanding the delegation of Presidential 
Permit authority to the State Department, he would be personally involved in the final decision on 
the Keystone XL Pipeline permit application.44  
As noted previously, on December 23, 2011, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 
2011 was enacted (P.L. 112-78). Under Section 501, “Permit for Keystone XL Pipeline,” the 
Secretary of State was required to grant the Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL pipeline 
project within 60 days, unless the President determined that the pipeline would not be in the 
national interest. On January 18, 2012, the State Department announced, with the President’s 
concurrence, that the Presidential Permit for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline would be denied 
at that time because it was determined not to serve the national interest. That recommendation 
“was predicated on the fact that the Department does not have sufficient time to obtain the 
information necessary to assess whether the project, in its current state, is in the national 
interest.”45 Milestones in the State Department process to make its national interest determination 
for the 2008 permit application are summarized in Table 2. 
                                                 
40 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the State Department’s Keystone XL 
Pipeline Announcement,” November 10, 2011. 
41 See TransCanada Corp., Media Advisory, “State of Nebraska to Play Major Role in Defining New Keystone XL 
Route Away From the Sandhills,” November 14, 2011, available at http://www.transcanada.com/5896.html.  
42 U.S. Department of State, November 10, 2011, footnote 38. 
43 Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, daily press briefing, January 22, 2013. 
44 KETV NewsWatch 7, “Uncut: KETV’s Rob McCartney Interviews President Obama,” Omaha, NE, November 1, 
2011, http://www.ketv.com/video/29652519/detail.html. 
45 U.S. Department of State, Media Note, “Denial of the Keystone XL Pipeline Application,” January 18, 2012, 
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/181473.htm.  
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Table 2. Milestones in National Interest Determination Process for the 2008 
Keystone XL Pipeline 
Date Party Description 
Aug.-
Oct. 
2011 
State 
Department 
The 90-day public review period for National Interest Determination begins; 
State Department holds public meetings in the six states through which the 
proposed pipeline would pass and in Washington, DC. 
Oct. 
2011 
Congress Fourteen Members of Congress request the State Department Office of 
Inspector General (IG) to investigate the department’s handling of the EIS and 
National Interest Determination for the Keystone XL project. 
Oct. 24, 
2011 
Governor of 
Nebraska 
The governor calls the Nebraska legislature into a special session to determine if 
siting legislation can be crafted and passed for pipeline routing in Nebraska.  
Nov. 4, 
2011 
State 
Department 
IG announces it is initiating a special review to determine to what extent the 
Department and all other parties involved complied with Federal laws and 
regulations relating to the Keystone XL pipeline permit process. 
Nov. 10, 
2011 
State 
Department 
The agency announces that additional information will be needed regarding  
alternative pipeline routes that would avoid the Nebraska Sand Hills before 
National Interest Determination can be made. Officials suggest that analysis 
needed to prepare the supplemental EIS, including additional public comment, 
could be completed as early as the first quarter of 2013. 
Nov. 14, 
2011 
TransCanada The company announces that it will work with the Nebraska Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) to identify a potential pipeline route that would 
avoid the Nebraska Sand Hills. 
Nov. 22, 
2011 
Governor of 
Nebraska 
The governor signs legislation passed during the special session directing the 
Nebraska DEQ to work collaboratively with the State Department to gather 
information necessary for a supplemental EIS.  
Nov. 
2011 
Nebraska 
DEQ/State 
Department 
The agencies begin to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
regarding their collaboration on the supplemental EIS. Nebraska DEQ hires a 
contractor to delineate the “Sand Hills” region that alternative routes must 
avoid. 
Dec. 23, 
2011 
Congress The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-78) is 
enacted, including provisions requiring the Secretary of State to issue a permit 
for the project within 60 days, unless the President determines the project is 
not in the national interest.  
Jan. 18, 
2012 
State 
Department 
The agency announces, with the President’s consent, that it will deny the 
Keystone XL permit. It states that its decision was predicated on the fact that 
the 60-day deadline under P.L. 112-78 did not provide sufficient time to obtain 
information necessary to assess the current project’s national interest. 
Feb. 3, 
2012 
State 
Department 
Formal permit denial issued; State Department and Nebraska DEQ suspend 
work on MOU regarding a supplemental EIS. 
Source: The Congressional Research Service, based on a review of events during, and affecting, the State 
Department’s national interest determination for the 2008 Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL 
pipeline project. 
Presidential Permit Application for the Reconfigured Keystone XL 
On February 27, 2012, in the wake of the Presidential Permit denial, TransCanada advised the 
State Department of its intent to file a new Presidential Permit application with an alternative 
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route in Nebraska.46 On April 19, 2012, the Nebraska DEQ received TransCanada’s Initial Report 
Identifying Alternative and Preferred Corridors for Nebraska Reroute route.47 Public meetings on 
the newly proposed routes were scheduled for May 9-17. On May 4, 2012, TransCanada 
submitted a new application for a Presidential Permit authorizing the construction, connection, 
operation, and maintenance of pipeline facilities for the importation of crude oil at the United 
State-Canada border. 48 
On September 5, 2012, TransCanada submitted to the Nebraska DEQ a Supplemental 
Environmental Report (SER) detailing its preferred alternative route for the Keystone XL 
Pipeline in Nebraska. The reconfigured Keystone XL pipeline project would cross the border at 
Phillips County, MT, and extend to a point on the existing Keystone pipeline system at Steele 
City, NE. Compared to the route proposed in the 2008 permit application, changes to the route 
involve only the segment through Nebraska. TransCanada’s SER served as the basis for the state’s 
draft evaluation of the new route, which the DEQ completed and made public on October 4, 
2012.49 The DEQ announced that it would hold a public comment period on the draft evaluation 
report to be concluded at a public hearing scheduled for December 4, 2012.50 The DEQ 
subsequently issued its final evaluation which cleared the way for the Governor’s approval of the 
new route on January 22, 2013.51 
The Gulf Coast Project, now proceeding as a standalone project (illustrated in Figure 1), does not 
involve an international border crossing. As a result, that segment of the Keystone XL pipeline 
system is not included as part of the Presidential Permit application. (However, as a pipeline 
carrying a hazardous material, this pipeline segment must still comply with a range of state and 
federal permit, approval, and consultation requirements, see “State Siting and Additional 
Environmental Requirements.”) 
Had the State Department been allowed to continue its national interest determination, as it 
originally proposed in November 2011, it could have completed the NEPA process with only the 
publication of a supplemental EIS that included analysis of new routes through Nebraska. 
However, denial of the Presidential Permit ended the NEPA process for the 2008 project. With the 
new Presidential Permit application, the State Department must begin a new NEPA process and, 
eventually, determine whether that project would serve the national interest.52  
                                                 
46 TransCanada Corp. press release, “TransCanada Set to Re-Apply for Keystone XL Permit Proceeding with Gulf 
Coast Project,” February 27, 2012, available at http://www.transcanada.com/5966.html. 
47 See Nebraska DEQ’s webpage “Nebraska Keystone XL Pipeline Evaluation: NDEQ’s Role in the Pipeline Review 
Process” https://ecmp.nebraska.gov/deq-seis/.  
48 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., “Application of TransCanada Keystone Pipeline L.P. for a Presidential Permit 
Authorizing the Construction, Operation, and Maintenance of Pipeline Facilities for the Importation of Crude Oil to be 
Located at the United States-Canada Border,” submitted May 4, 2012; available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/
proj_docs/permitapplication/index.htm. 
49 Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality, Draft Evaluation Report, October 2012, available at 
http://deq.ne.gov/PipeMeet.nsf/Menu?OpenPage. 
50 Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality, “NDEQ Releases Pipeline Draft Evaluation Report,” press release, 
October 30, 2012. 
51 Dave Heineman, Governor of Nebraska, letter to President Obama and Secretary Clinton, January 22, 2013, 
http://www.governor.nebraska.gov/news/2013/01/docs/0122_Pipeline_Approval.pdf. 
52 See the State Department’s “New Keystone XL Pipeline Project” webpage at http://www.keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/ 
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On June 15, 2012, the State Department published a Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare a 
Supplemental EIS for the new Keystone XL pipeline permit application.53 It will supplement the 
August 26, 2011, final EIS to include information and analysis about potential impacts associated 
with the new proposed route within Nebraska. The State Department has stated that it “will 
obviously take ... the Nebraska environmental report into consideration as we continue our federal 
review process.”54 It will also include any other subjects that may need to be updated as a result 
of significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns related to the 
May 2012 permit application. 
Although EIS preparation will involve supplementing previously produced documents, the State 
Department is obligated to complete certain steps of the NEPA process again. In particular, the 
department is obligated to allow for public scoping of the project; prepare both a draft and final 
EIS; and respond to public and agency comments on those documents. In particular, as 
announced in the State Department June NOI, the department included public participation in the 
scoping process for the supplemental EIS (which ended on July 30, 2012). After this process, a 
draft supplemental EIS will be published and mailed to relevant federal, state, and local 
government agencies, elected officials, environmental and public interest groups, Indian tribes, 
affected landowners, commenters, local libraries, newspapers, and other interested parties. The 
State Department will then consider comments on the draft supplemental EIS and revise the 
document, as necessary, before issuing a final supplemental EIS. 
State Siting and Additional Environmental Requirements 
As stated above, the federal government does not currently exercise siting authority over oil 
pipelines. Instead, siting for the Keystone XL pipeline must comply with any applicable state 
law—which can vary from state to state. South Dakota, for example, required TransCanada to 
apply for a permit for the Keystone XL pipeline from the state public utility commission, which 
issued the permit on April 25, 2010.55 Montana requires a certificate from the state’s Department 
of Environmental Quality.56  
At the time of TransCanada’s initial application for a Presidential Permit, Nebraska did not have 
any permitting requirements that applied specifically to the construction and operation of oil 
pipelines, although a state statute does include an “eminent domain” provision, which grants 
eminent domain authority to oil pipeline companies that are unable to obtain the necessary 
property rights from the relevant property owners.57 However, due to the controversy surrounding 
the Keystone XL project, Nebraska’s governor called a special session of its legislature to enact 
legislation to assert state authority over pipeline siting. Subsequently, the state enacted two 
                                                 
53 U.S. State Department, “Notice of Intent To Prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) and To 
Conduct Scoping and To Initiate Consultation Under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act for the 
Proposed TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline Proposed To Extend From Phillips, MT (the Border Crossing) to Steele 
City, NE,” 77 Federal Register 36032, June 15, 2012. 
54 Victoria Nuland, January 22, 2012. 
55 South Dakota Public Utilities Commission, Final Decision and Order; Notice of Entry Before the Public Utilities 
Commission of the State of South Dakota, In the Matter of the Application by TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP for 
a Permit Under the South Dakota Energy Conversion and Transmission Facilities Act to Construct the Keystone 
Pipeline Project, HP07-001, http://puc.sd.gov/commission/orders/HydrocarbonPipeline/2008/hp07-001.pdf. 
56 Montana Major Facility Siting Act, Title 75, Chapter 20. 
57 Nebraska Rev. Stat. §57-1101. 
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laws—one that would affect the siting of the Keystone XL pipeline (see Table 1) and one that 
outlines procedures for siting any future oil pipeline in Nebraska.58 The latter will require an oil 
pipeline carrier proposing to construct a major oil pipeline in Nebraska to file an application with 
the state’s Public Service Commission and receive approval before beginning construction. 
Additionally, the law authorized the commission to follow certain procedures before deciding 
whether a proposed oil pipeline would serve the public interest. 
Although there are limited federal requirements applicable to oil pipeline siting, there are 
numerous local, state, tribal, and federal requirements applicable to pipeline construction, 
operation, and maintenance. For example, the August 2011 final EIS for the Keystone XL 
pipeline identified a list of permits, licenses, approvals, and consultation that would be required 
before the pipeline project could proceed.59 From that list, following are a few of the requirements 
that would likely apply to any pipeline project, listed by agency with jurisdiction over that 
requirement: 
• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—issuance of a permit for sections of the 
project that require placement of dredge and fill material in waters of the United 
States, including wetlands (pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act), or 
for pipeline crossings of navigable waters (pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act);  
• The Environmental Protection Agency—review and issue National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System permits for the discharge of pollutants in state 
waters (pursuant to Section 402 of the Clean Water Act);  
• The Bureau of Land Management—grant temporary use permits for portions of 
the project that would encroach on federal lands;  
• U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service—consider impacts to federally listed endangered 
species (pursuant to the Endangered Species Act) and provide a Biological 
Opinion if the project is likely to adversely affect federally listed species. 
• Multiple state/county agencies—consult on and/or consider issuance of permits 
for projects that cross navigable waters or state highways, or involve work 
potentially affecting state streams, cultural resources, or natural resources.  
The time it takes to complete the NEPA process has been a focus of attention for the first 
Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL pipeline. However, for past pipeline projects, 
obtaining all required local, state, tribal, and federal permits, approvals, and licenses may take a 
similar amount of time. By way of example, for the Alberta Clipper pipeline project (another oil 
sands pipeline) completion of the NEPA process, the national interest determination and issuance 
of a Presidential Permit took approximately two years. Obtaining the necessary permits, 
approvals, and licenses for construction of the pipeline took an additional two years. 
                                                 
58 See Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman’s November 23, 2011, statement “Common Sense Solution,” available at 
http://www.governor.nebraska.gov/columns/2011/11/23_solution.html.  
59 Keystone XL pipeline project final EIS, “Introduction: Section 1.10. Permits, Approvals, and Regulatory 
Requirements,” Table 1.10-1. 
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Legislative Efforts to Change Permitting Authority 
In light of the State Department’s denial of the initial Keystone XL permit, some in Congress 
have sought alternative means to support development of the pipeline. As stated in the 
“Introduction,” there were a number of legislative proposals in the 112th Congress to change the 
federal permitting authority for the pipeline. H.R. 3548 would have transferred the permitting 
authority over the Keystone XL pipeline project from the State Department to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), requiring the commission to issue a permit for the project 
within 30 days of enactment.60 Other proposals, such as H.R. 3811 and S. 3445, would have 
directly shifted permitting authority to Congress, effectively approving upon enactment the 
permit applications filed by TransCanada in 2008 and 2012, respectively.  
Changing, or eliminating altogether, the State Department’s role in issuing cross-border 
infrastructure permits may raise questions about the President’s executive authority (further 
discussed in the Appendix A). In response to H.R. 3548, for example, the State Department’s key 
official on Keystone XL testified before Congress: 
The legislation raises serious questions about existing legal authorities, questions the 
continuing force of much of the federal and all of the state and local environmental and land 
use management authority over the pipeline, and overrides foreign policy and national 
security considerations implicated by a cross border permit, which are properly assessed by 
the State Department.61 
Such proposals may also raise some administrative and legal challenges for FERC or other 
federal agencies. A senior FERC official testified that a proposal like H.R. 3548 does not provide 
enough time for an “adequate” public record, provides no clear authority for enforcing measures 
required in the EIS, does not articulate a process for authorizing alterations to the pipeline route 
in Nebraska, and is unclear about permits required from other federal agencies, among other 
concerns.62 For additional analysis of associated legal issues, see CRS Report R42124, Proposed 
Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal Issues, by Adam Vann, Kristina Alexander, and Kenneth R. Thomas. 
Given the State Department’s initial permit denial, and opposition from various environmental 
groups and stakeholders along the pipeline route, legal challenges are a possibility. However, in 
the event of a challenge based on an environmental issue, the distinction between State 
Department actions required under NEPA and those required under its authority to issue a 
Presidential Permit would be relevant. NEPA does not create a private right of action. Instead, 
judicial challenges to a federal agency action under NEPA are brought pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 U.S.C. §§706 et seq.). Presidential actions, however, are 
not subject to judicial review under the APA.63 That is, the final agency action reflected in an 
                                                 
60 The Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2012, Part II (H.R. 4348), which passed in the House on April 18, 
2012, also contained these provisions, but they were subsequently dropped from the bill in conference committee with 
the Senate. 
61 Kerri-Ann Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
Testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Power Hearing on the 
North American Energy Access Act, January 25, 2012. 
62 Jeff Wright, Director, Office of Energy Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Testimony before the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Energy and Power Hearing on the North American Energy 
Access Act, January 25, 2012. 
63 While the APA’s definition of “agency” does not specifically exclude or include the president, the Supreme Court 
has held that exercises of presidential authority are not subject to judicial review because the president is not an agency 
(continued...) 
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ROD is subject to judicial review, but the State Department’s national interest determination, 
made under its authority to issue a Presidential Permit, is not. For more analysis of the State 
Department’s authority to grant a Presidential Permit, see Appendix A.  
Arguments For and Against the Pipeline 
Proponents of the Keystone XL pipeline, including Canadian agencies and U.S. and Canadian 
petroleum industry stakeholders, base their arguments supporting the pipeline primarily on 
increasing the diversity of the U.S. petroleum supply and economic benefits, especially jobs. 
Pipeline opponents are generally environmental organizations and community groups. Their 
concerns stem from issues that can be broadly categorized as the pipeline’s global or community 
impacts. “Global” impacts stem primarily from concern regarding the lifecycle greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions associated with the development of Canadian oil sands, compared to 
conventional oil or renewable fuels. Although the concern regarding GHG emissions is focused 
primarily on the extraction process, opponents also argue that use of the oil sands crude promotes 
continued U.S. dependency on fossil fuels. Concern over adverse community impacts of the 
pipeline stems primarily from impacts associated with the pipeline’s construction and long-term 
use on private land—particularly its potential to affect agricultural uses and cattle grazing. 
Communities along the pipeline route are also concerned about the risk of a potential release of 
heavy crude and the operators’ ability to respond to a release, particularly in remote areas. 
Impacts to the Nebraska Sand Hills 
In the process of examining factors necessary to determine whether the Presidential Permit for the 
original Keystone XL pipeline route was in the national interest, the State Department decided 
that it needed to assess potential alternative pipeline routes that would avoid the Sand Hills region 
of Nebraska. Unique characteristics of the Sand Hills—including its high concentration of 
wetlands, extensive areas of very shallow groundwater, and its sensitive ecosystem—were 
identified as factors that resulted in increasing public concern over the proposed pipeline location. 
For these reasons, TransCanada announced it would work with the Nebraska DEQ to identify a 
potential pipeline route that would avoid the Sand Hills. 
To understand concerns about the potential environmental impacts of a pipeline crossing the Sand 
Hills (also referred to as the Sandhills), an understanding of the unique size and structure of the 
region is useful. The Sand Hills region is a 19,600 square mile sand dune formation stabilized by 
native grasslands that cover 95% of its surface. The surface is highly susceptible to wind erosion 
if the grassland is disturbed.64 Below its surface lie hundreds of feet of coarse sand and gravel. 
Essentially, the porous soil acts like a giant sponge that quickly absorbs precipitation, allowing 
very little to run off. In some areas, the water table reaches the land surface—a characteristic that 
creates lakes that dot the region as well as 1.3 million acres of wetlands. The loose, porous soil 
and sensitivity to wind erosion have been factors contributing to a lack of development on the 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
(Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 470 (1994)). The Court has also held that the APA does not apply to the president 
based on separation of powers principles (Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992)). 
64 For more information, see the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service web page on the Sand 
Hills at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pfw/ne/ne4.htm.  
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Sand Hills. As a result, the region contains the most intact natural habitat of the Great Plains of 
the United States. The porosity of the soil is also relevant because the Sand Hills sits atop the 
Ogallala Aquifer—one of the largest freshwater aquifer systems in the world.65 
The highly porous soil of the Sand Hills makes it a significant recharge zone in the northern 
Ogallala Aquifer. That is, the sandy, porous soil of the Sand Hills allows a significant amount of 
surface water to enter (recharge) the aquifer system. Water from the aquifer also accounts for a 
significant amount of water use—78% of the region’s public water, 83% of irrigation water in 
Nebraska, and 30% of water used in the United States for irrigation and agriculture. 
Potential impacts to the Ogallala Aquifer and the Sand Hills identified in the final EIS for 
TransCanada’s original permit application included groundwater contamination after an 
accidental spill or leak of crude oil during the construction or operation of the proposed pipeline. 
Along the preferred route of the originally proposed pipeline configuration, areas in the Sand 
Hills region were identified as locations where the water table may be close to the surface. The 
depth to groundwater was less than 10 feet for approximately 65 miles of the preferred pipeline 
route in Nebraska. Both the soil porosity and the close proximity of groundwater to the surface 
increase the potential that a release of oil from the pipeline could contaminate groundwater in the 
region.66 The new route alternative TransCanada has proposed for the Nebraska section of the 
Keystone XL pipeline avoids the Sand Hills and certain areas nearby with similar soil properties 
(Figure 2). However, the pipeline would still cross part of the Ogallala aquifer.  
                                                 
65 The entire Ogallala Aquifer system stretches across eight states generally from north to south to include South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas and underlies about 174,000 
square miles. 
66 Generally, a release of crude oil to land would not necessarily result in groundwater contamination. In addition to the 
depth from the land surface to groundwater and the characteristics of the environment into which the crude oil is 
released (e.g., characteristics of the underlying soils), the potential for crude oil to reach groundwater would depend on 
factors such as the volume of the spill, the duration of the release, and the viscosity and density of the crude oil.  
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Figure 2. Keystone XL Preferred Alternative Route in Nebraska 
 
Sources: Congressional Research Service, adapted from TransCanada, 
TransCanada Keystone XL Pipeline Project, SER for the Nebraska Reroute, 
September 5, 2012, p. 4, https://ecmp.nebraska.gov/deq-seis/
DisplayDoc.aspx?DocID=1FDGc%2bzrMX00l4O41xNwaA%3d%3d; Sandhills 
shape file from University of Nebraska, http://snr.unl.edu/data/geographygis/
NebrGISgeology.asp#topography. 
Impact on U.S. Energy Security 
In its Presidential Permit application, TransCanada asserts that constructing the proposed 
Keystone XL pipeline is in the U.S national interest to maintain adequate crude oil supplies for 
U.S. refineries. The application argues that the pipeline will allow U.S. refiners to substitute 
Canadian supply for other foreign crude supply and to obtain direct pipeline access to secure and 
growing Canadian crude output. In particular, the application asserts that the pipeline would allow 
the United States to decrease its dependence on foreign crude oil supplies from Mexico and 
Venezuela, the two largest oil exporters into the U.S. Gulf Coast.67 Consistent with this argument, 
H.R. 3900 would seek to ensure that any crude oil and bitumen transported by the Keystone XL 
pipeline, or any resulting refined products, would have to remain in U.S. markets subject to a 
presidential waiver allowing foreign export.68 Depending upon the circumstances, however, such 
                                                 
67 TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., September 19, 2008, pp. 6-8. 
68 On February 7, 2012, the House Energy and Committee rejected an amendment to H.R. 3548 offered by 
Representative Edward Markey containing similar export restrictions. 
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restrictions could raise concerns with respect to international trade agreements, among other 
considerations. 
Energy security arguments have taken on additional weight in light of the recent geopolitical 
tensions in the Middle East and North Africa. However, it is worth noting that even if Keystone 
XL is built, prices for the crude oil it carries as well as for domestically produced oil from 
elsewhere will continue to be affected by international events. The oil market is globally 
integrated and events in major producer and consumer countries can affect prices everywhere.69 
For example, the disruption of Libyan supply in early 2011 contributed to higher crude oil prices 
in the United States, even though the United States imported almost no oil from Libya before the 
unrest broke out.70  
Canadian Oil Imports in the Overall U.S. Supply Context71 
Gross U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products averaged 11.4 million bpd (Mbpd) in 
2011.72 U.S. oil exports averaged 2.9 Mbpd (almost entirely petroleum products), leaving net 
imports at 8.4 Mbpd.73 U.S. net imports have fallen by 4.1 Mbpd or 33% since they peaked in 
2005 as a result of lower total oil consumption and higher domestic production. Some of this 
decline could be mitigated in the near term as oil demand recovers from the recession. However, 
there is increasing sentiment among forecasters that U.S. oil imports have passed their high water 
mark already and may remain relatively flat or fall in the foreseeable future.74 
Among the largest sources of U.S. gross oil imports are Canada (2.7 Mbpd), the Persian Gulf (1.9 
Mbpd), Mexico (1.2 Mbpd), and Venezuela (0.9 Mbpd). Imports from the latter two sources have 
decreased in recent years in part due to lower need for imports described above and in part due to 
developments in those countries. Mexican production has been falling since 2004 because new oil 
developments have not been able to offset depletion at Mexico’s giant Cantarell field. Imports 
from Venezuela, another key source of U.S. imports, have also fallen. Venezuelan production 
never fully recovered after a strike at its national oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, in 2002-
2003. Venezuelan production today is nearly 1 Mbpd less than that achieved in 2001. In recent 
years, Venezuela has also been trying to diversify business away from the United States, for 
example, by increasing exports to China.75 
                                                 
69 This is the case unless the oil is stranded due to transport bottlenecks. Ironically, the bottleneck for crude oil flowing 
south from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast—which Keystone XL would help alleviate—helped insulate Midwestern 
crude oil prices from the impacts of unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. However, as is discussed below, this 
may have benefited Midwestern refiners but probably did not significantly reduce costs for U.S. consumers.  
70 For more about this, see CRS Report R41683, Middle East and North Africa Unrest: Implications for Oil and 
Natural Gas Markets, by Michael Ratner. 
71 For a primer on the oil market, see CRS Video Brief Introduction to the Oil Market, at http://www.crs.gov/analysis/
Pages/WVB00002.aspx.  
72 All data in this section are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Petroleum & Other Liquids 
(http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm), International Energy Statistics (http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
IEDIndex3.cfm), and the Short Term Energy Outlook (http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/). 
73 For context, the United States consumed 18.8 Mbpd in 2011, more than 20% of the world’s oil market. Net imports 
are gross or total imports less total exports. This section will focus on gross imports, though it should be noted that 
among U.S. petroleum exports about 0.2 Mbpd of petroleum products go to Canada and 0.4 Mbpd to Mexico. 
74 For more analysis, see CRS Report R42465, U.S. Oil Imports and Exports, by Robert Pirog. 
75 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela,” February 2010, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Venezuela/Oil.html. 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 22 
Meanwhile, Canadian production and exports to the United States have increased, primarily due 
to growing output from the oil sands in western Canada. Energy markets in the United States and 
Canada are well integrated by pipeline infrastructure; nearly all Canadian energy exports go to the 
United States.76 Canadian oil production has increased about 0.2 Mbpd since 2005 and exports to 
the United States have increased by 0.5 Mbpd (see Figure 3).77 Some expect Canadian oil 
production to grow by nearly 2 Mbpd by 2025 due to increased output from the oil sands.78  
Figure 3. Gross U.S. Oil Imports by Major Sources  
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum & Other Liquids: U.S. Imports by 
Country of Origin, March 19, 2012. http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#imports. 
Oil Sands, Keystone XL, and the U.S. Oil Market 
Oil sands (also referred to as tar sands) are a mixture of clay, sand, water, and heavy black 
viscous oil known as bitumen. Oil sands require more processing than conventional crude oil. Oil 
sands are processed to extract the bitumen, which can then be sent to refineries in one of two 
forms. Bitumen can be upgraded into “syncrude,” a light crude that is suitable for pipeline 
transport and is relatively easy to refine. Alternatively, bitumen can be blended with lighter 
                                                 
76 For further analysis of U.S.-Canada energy trade, see CRS Report R41875, The U.S.-Canada Energy Relationship: 
Joined at the Well, by Paul W. Parfomak and Michael Ratner. 
77 As in the United States, Canadian consumption fell due to economic downturn. This allowed the increment in exports 
to be higher than the increment in production.  
78 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets, and Pipelines, June 2011, p. 
2, http://www.capp.ca/forecast/Pages/default.aspx. 
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hydrocarbons to form a heavy crude (diluted bitumen or “dilbit”) that can be transported by 
pipeline. The bulk of oil sands supply growth is expected to be in the form of the latter.79  
Most oil sands imports into the United States currently go to the Midwest, where refineries have 
been investing in complex refining capacity to process growing volumes of heavy Canadian 
crude.80 The U.S. Gulf Coast region already has a large amount of complex refining capacity and 
is well suited for processing Canadian heavy crude oil. Gulf Coast refiners currently process 
heavy crudes from Venezuela, Mexico, and elsewhere. Complex refineries in the Gulf Coast may 
be best equipped to handle a large increase of heavy oil sands crude, though they may still need to 
adjust processes and make new capital investments in equipment to accommodate particular 
crudes’ characteristics,81 especially if the new Canadian crudes will be used in large amounts.82 
There are 15 refineries within Keystone XL’s (technically, the Gulf Coast Project’s) proposed 
delivery area in Texas that currently process heavy crude oil similar in composition to the oil that 
Keystone XL pipeline would carry.83  
Oil production from the oil sands is increasing, as is production from the Bakken and other areas 
of the U.S. Midwest.84 Transport options to carry crude from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast are 
limited. (In the past, crude oil had been shipped up from the Gulf Coast to Midwestern refineries.) 
The resulting abundance of crude oil in the Midwest has driven down crude oil prices in that 
region relative to Gulf Coast and international crude markets. Midwestern refiners benefit from 
the lower cost of crude, but it does not translate to substantially lower consumer prices for 
gasoline or other products in the region. The Midwest still brings in refined products from the 
Gulf Coast, which keeps refined products prices in line with national and international levels.85  
Oil sands producers are interested in Keystone XL because it would expand their market reach 
into the Gulf Coast. The Gulf Coast region holds half of U.S. refining capacity, including a 
substantial amount of technologically advanced capacity capable of processing heavy sour crudes 
in large volumes. Reaching a larger market and one with more advanced refining capacity could 
increase the price these producers receive for their crude. For their part, Gulf Coast refiners are 
interested in the Keystone XL pipeline because it increases the supply of heavy sour crude in the 
Gulf region, potentially bringing down their input costs relative to the options they currently have 
available. Canadian Natural Resources Limited, an oil sands producer, and Valero Energy 
Corporation, a large U.S. refiner, are among those that contracted for shipping capacity on the 
Keystone XL pipeline. 
                                                 
79 CAPP, 2011, p. 7. 
80 CAPP, 2011, p. 13. According to CAPP, refineries adding capacity to process more heavy oil in the Midwest include 
those in Roxana, IL; Whiting, IN, and Detroit, MI.  
81 Baker Hughes, Planning Ahead for Effective Canadian Crude Processing, Baker Petrolite White Paper, 2010, 
http://www.bakerhughes.com/assets/media/whitepapers/4c2a3c8ffa7e1c3c7400001d/file/28271-
canadian_crudeoil_update_whitepaper_06-10.pdf.pdf&fs=1497549. 
82 For a description of which units refineries may need to add (or have added) to be able to process more Canadian oil 
sands supply, see Praveen Gunaseelan and Christopher Buehler, “Changing US Crude Imports Are Driving Refinery 
Upgrades,” Oil and Gas Journal, August 10, 2009. 
83 U.S. Department of State, April 15, 2011. p. 1-4. 
84 See increased U.S. crude oil production in the Midwest under the PADD2 heading at the following source: Energy 
Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, Crude Oil Production (by PADD), Petroleum & Other 
Liquids, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm. 
85 Adjusted for transport costs and other regional differences.  
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With expanded pipeline capacity extending to the U.S. Gulf Coast, Canadian oil sands crude may 
compete with other heavy crudes such as those from Mexico, Venezuela, and elsewhere.86 It is 
difficult to predict precisely how this competition will play out, but it may take place through 
shifting discounts or premiums on crude oils from various sources.87 It may be possible for 
Canadian oil supplies to effectively “push out” waterborne shipments from other countries, 
although this depends on a wide range of market conditions. Waterborne crudes may more easily 
go to other destinations than Canadian crudes, though like Canadian crudes they can be tied to 
specialized refining capacity, as is true for Venezuelan heavy crudes.  
There is concern that increased supply of crude to the Gulf Coast may result in larger petroleum 
product exports rather than contributing to lower domestic fuel cost. Although the United States is 
a net importer of oil and petroleum products, it does export some petroleum products. U.S. 
petroleum product exports rose when domestic demand declined in the wake of the recession 
while foreign demand for certain fuels, such as diesel, remained relatively robust. Issues around 
potential export of Canadian crude oil carried on Keystone XL or export of products made from 
that crude oil are addressed in CRS Report R42465, U.S. Oil Imports and Exports, by Robert 
Pirog. 
If Keystone XL secures growing oil sands output for the United States, it could push out seaborne 
crudes from elsewhere, regardless of where the product is ultimately sold. If the absence of the 
pipeline encourages Canadian oil sands producers and pipeline companies to find an alternate 
export route through the Canadian West Coast, Canadian supplies may displace heavy oil supplies 
in other markets and potentially allow relatively more overseas imports coming into the Gulf 
Coast. This possibility is discussed further below.  
It should be noted that Keystone XL aims to alleviate two potential bottlenecks in the pipeline 
transportation system: Between Western Canada and the United States, and between the U.S. 
Midwest and the Gulf Coast. Existing pipelines between Canada and the United States have spare 
capacity to carry rising Canadian production for the time being. According to some estimates, 
additional capacity, such as Keystone XL, may not be needed until 2019.88 The latter bottleneck, 
between the Midwest and the Gulf Coast, is already at capacity and, as described above, has 
resulted in a discount for crude oil in the Midwest (though not for petroleum products). The Gulf 
Coast Pipeline Project, the lower leg of originally proposed Keystone XL pipeline, would address 
this second bottleneck and help alleviate the discount for Midwestern crudes.  
Other Pipeline Projects 
Apart from Keystone XL, several other pipeline proposals could help carry growing Canadian 
crude oil supplies to the U.S. Gulf Coast. On October 16, 2011, Enbridge announced it would 
purchase ConocoPhillips’ share of the Seaway pipeline and reverse its direction to bring crude oil 
from the Midwest to the Gulf Coast. ConocoPhillips had kept the pipeline running northward to 
serve its refinery in Ponca City, OK. However, the glut of oil in the Midwest had resulted in the 
                                                 
86 Center for Energy Economics and Bureau of Economic Geology, Overview of the Alberta Oil Sands, University of 
Texas at Austin, 2006, p. 16, http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/documents/overview_of_alberta_oil_sands.pdf. 
87 For more about the U.S. refining system, see CRS Report R41478, The U.S. Oil Refining Industry: Background in 
Changing Markets and Fuel Policies, by Anthony Andrews et al.. 
88 Testimony of Jim Burkhard, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, US and Global 
Energy Outlook for 2012, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., January 31, 2012. 
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pipeline running at low volumes. Nonetheless, ConocoPhillips had been uninterested in reversing 
the pipeline. ConocoPhillips, which is spinning off its refining business,89 sold its share of 
Seaway to Enbridge. Enbridge and Seaway shareholder Enterprise Products Partners L.P. are 
reversing the direction of crude oil flows on the Seaway pipeline to enable it to transport oil from 
Cushing, OK, to the U.S. Gulf Coast. The pipeline is expected to start running southward at an 
initial capacity of 150,000 bpd starting in May 2012, with capacity expected to increase to 
400,000 bpd in 2013. The reversal is expected to reduce the glut of crude oil in the Midwest and 
reconnect Midwestern crude prices to global prices (driving the U.S. Benchmark West Texas 
Intermediate crude higher).90  
Prior to the Seaway sale, Enbridge had reported significant commitments for two new pipeline 
projects: Flanagan South, which would carry oil from Illinois to Oklahoma, and Wrangler, which 
would carry oil from Oklahoma to Texas.91 According to Enbridge, the project would duplicate 
existing routes and would not cross an international border, so it would not require a Presidential 
Permit. Enbridge already has cross border pipeline capacity connecting Alberta to Illinois. 
However, according to press reports, Wrangler has been canceled in light of the Seaway purchase 
and reversal.92 Enbridge is moving forward with the Flanagan South project, which will have an 
initial capacity of about 600,000 bpd and run alongside Enbridge’s existing Spearhead pipeline 
(see Figure 4).93 Like Keystone XL/Gulf Coast Project, Flanagan South and a southbound 
Seaway may facilitate increased flow of Canadian crude to the U.S. Gulf Coast.  
                                                 
89 ConocoPhillips, “ConocoPhillips Pursuing Plan to Separate into Two Stand-Alone, Publicly Traded Companies,” 
press release, July 14, 2011, http://www.conocophillips.com/EN/newsroom/news_releases/2011news/Pages/07-14-
2011.aspx. 
90 Jenny Gross, “NYMEX Oil Gets Boost From Pipeline Reversal,” Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2012.  
91 Bradley Olson , “Enbridge Pursuing Alternative to Transcanada’s Keystone XL,” Bloomberg, November 9, 2011. 
92 Ben Lefebvre, “Enterprise Products Cancels Wrangler Pipeline,” Dow Jones Newswires, November 16, 2011. 
93 Enbridge, “Flanagan South Project Fact Sheet,” April 1, 2012, http://www.enbridge.com/
FlanaganSouthPipeline.aspx. 
Keystone XL Pipeline Project: Key Issues 
 
Congressional Research Service 26 
Figure 4. Proposed Enbridge Flanagan South Pipeline Route 
 
 
Source: Enbridge, “Flanagan South Project Fact Sheet,” April 1, 2012, 
http://www.enbridge.com/FlanaganSouthPipeline.aspx. 
Canadian Oil to Alternative Markets 
There are proposals to increase the capacity for oil from Alberta to reach the Canadian east and 
west coast. Currently, nearly all of Canada’s oil exports go to the United States, mostly through 
north-south pipelines. Only one major oil pipeline extends from Alberta to Canada’s west coast: 
the Trans Mountain Pipeline, which is owned by Houston-based Kinder Morgan and has a 
capacity of 300,000 bpd. Some of the oil from the Trans Mountain Pipeline is loaded onto tankers 
and shipped from Vancouver. Nearly all of the quantities shipped by sea go to the United States, 
though a small amount goes to China and other Asian countries.94 Proposals for additional east 
and westbound capacity include: 
• Kinder Morgan has plans to expand the Trans Mountain Pipeline to 850,000 bpd 
by 2017, more than doubling its existing capacity, and expanding west coast 
shipping facilities.95 The expansion has received the necessary commitments 
from parties interested in shipping additional crude volumes. Some shippers are 
                                                 
94 According to the Global Trade Atlas, about 0.5% of Canadian crude exports went to China in 2011 (accessed April 
25, 2012).  
95 Christopher Smith, “KMEP Advances Trans Moutain Crude Pipeline Expansion,” Oil & Gas Journal, April 6, 2012.  
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interested in using the additional capacity to export more Canadian crude oil to 
Asia. Kinder Morgan still needs regulatory approvals from Canadian authorities 
and is working to gain the support of stakeholders.96 There is some opposition to 
the project, including from groups concerned about additional tanker traffic near 
Vancouver and potential oil spill risks.97  
• Enbridge has proposed a new pipeline: the Northern Gateway project would have 
a 525,000 bpd capacity to send oil from Edmonton to Kitimat, British 
Columbia.98 However, Northern Gateway faces opposition from groups including 
some First Nations communities and environmental groups.99  
• Several projects are considering moving oil east rather than to the west coast. 
According to reports, TransCanada is considering a pipeline project sending oil 
east from Alberta to Quebec and New Brunswick which could also carry crude 
bound for export.100 Enbridge is also interested in expanding eastbound capacity 
by reversing its Line 9 Pipeline.101 Some suggest this could potentially lead to oil 
sands crude traveling east, through Montreal and then through another pipeline to 
Portland, ME, from which point it could be exported.102 As with other pipeline 
projects, these also face opposition from environmental groups concerned about 
oil spill risks and/or generally opposed to oil sands development.  
These projects reflect anticipated growth of western Canadian oil production and an interest by 
Canadian oil producers to diversify their available markets beyond U.S. customers, including to 
reach rapidly growing Asian oil demand. Proposals have received criticism from 
environmentalists. Because it would require construction of a completely new pipeline, Northern 
Gateway in particular has been criticized by some environmental and First Nations groups.103  
Canadian interests assert that Canadian oil sales to Asian markets, where oil demand is growing 
rapidly, are more likely if greater shipments to the United States are not possible.104 A study 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy suggested that:  
if pipeline projects to the BC [British Columbia] coast are built, they are likely to be utilized. 
This is because of the relatively short marine distances to major northeast Asia markets, 
                                                 
96 David Ebner and Justine Hunter, “U.S. Company Plans Billion-Dollar Expansion of Trans Mountain Pipeline,” The 
Global and Mail, April 13, 2012.  
97 Jeff Lee, “Vancouver Council, Park Board to Formally Oppose Kinder Morgan Pipeline Expansion,” Vancouver Sun, 
April 24, 2012. 
98 Enbridge, “Northern Gateway at a Glance,” press release, 2011, http://www.northerngateway.ca/project-info/
northern-gateway-at-a-glance. The project would also include a pipeline to allow the import of 193,000 bpd of 
condensate, a light hydrocarbon that can be blended with bitumen to allow pipeline transport. 
99 “Enbridge Pipeline and Tanker Opposition Mounts as Risks Multiply,” Marketwire, March 13, 2012. 
100 Nathan Vanderklippe and Shawn McCarthy, “TransCanada Looks East as Gateway Pipeline Gets Bogged Down,” 
The Globe and Mail, March 22, 2012. 
101 “Enbridge Pipelines Inc. - Line 9 Reversal Phase I Project (OH-005-2011),” (Project Application), National Energy 
Board (Government of Canada), http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/nbrdgln9phs1/nbrdgln9phs1-
eng.html. 
102 Matt Dodge, “Court Decision Affects South Portland-Montreal Pipeline,” Maine Biz, April 3, 2012.  
103 Derrick Penner, “Opposition to Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline grows,” Vancouver Sun, December 2, 2010. 
104 Edward Welsch, “TransCanada: Oil Sands Exports Will Go to Asia if Blocked in U.S.,” Dow Jones Newswires, 
June 30, 2010.  
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future expected growth there in refining capacity and increasing ownership interests by 
Chinese companies especially in oil sands production. Such increased capacity would alter 
global crude trade patterns. Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) crudes would be 
“lost” from the USA, going instead to Asia. There they would displace the world’s balancing 
crude oils, Middle Eastern and African predominantly OPEC grades, which would in turn 
move to the USA. The net effect would be substantially higher U.S. dependency on crude 
oils from those sources versus scenarios where capacity to move WCSB crudes to Asia was 
limited.105 
Economic Impact of the Pipeline 
In addition to supply diversity arguments, some Keystone XL pipeline proponents support the 
project based on economic benefits associated with expanding U.S. pipeline infrastructure. A 
recent study by the Energy Policy Research Foundation, for example, concludes that “the 
Keystone expansion would provide net economic benefits from improved efficiencies in both the 
transportation and processing of crude oil of $100 million-$600 million annually, in addition to an 
immediate boost in construction employment.”106 A 2009 report from the Canadian Energy 
Research Institute (CERI) commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute similarly 
concludes that 
As investment and production in oil sands ramps up in Canada, the pace of economic activity 
quickens and demand for US goods and services increase rapidly, resulting in an estimated 
343 thousand new US jobs between 2011 and 2015. Demand for U.S. goods and services 
continues to climb throughout the period, adding an estimated $34 billion to US GDP in 
2015, $40.4 billion in 2020, and $42.2 billion in 2025.107 
These CERI estimates apply to the entire oil sands industry, however, not only the Keystone XL 
project, and they are derived from a proprietary economic analysis which has not been subject to 
external review. Some stakeholders point to State Department and other studies reporting much 
lower anticipated economic benefits.108 Consequently, it is difficult to determine what specific 
economic and employment impacts may ultimately be attributable to the Keystone XL pipeline. 
Nonetheless, given the physical scale of the project, it could be expected to increase employment 
and investment at least during construction. 
Lifecycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Oil production from oil sands is controversial because it has significant environmental impacts, 
including emissions of greenhouse gases during extraction and processing, disturbance of mined 
                                                 
105 EnSys Energy & Systems, Inc., Keystone XL Assessment: Final Report, Prepared for the U.S. Department of 
Energy, Office of Policy & International Affairs, December 23, 2010, p. 118. 
106 Energy Policy Research Foundation, Inc., The Value of the Canadian Oil Sands (….to the United States): An 
Assessment of the Keystone Proposal to Expand Oil Sands Shipments to Gulf Coast Refiners, Washington, DC, 
November 29, 2010, p. 2, http://www.eprinc.org/pdf/oilsandsvalue.pdf. 
107 Canadian Energy Research Institute, The Impacts of Canadian Oil Sands Development on the United States’ 
Economy, Final Report, Calgary, Alberta, October 2009, p. vii. 
108 See, for example, Cornell University Global Labor Institute, Pipe Dreams? Jobs Gained, Jobs Lost by the 
Construction of Keystone XL, September 28, 2011; National Wildlife Federation, “TransCanada Exaggerating Jobs 
Claims for Keystone XL,” November 9, 2010, http://www.dirtyoilsands.org/files/Keystone_XL_Jobs_11-09-10.pdf. 
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land, and impacts on wildlife and water quality.109 Because bitumen in oil sands cannot be 
pumped from a conventional well, it must be mined, usually using strip mining or open pit 
techniques, or the oil can be extracted with underground heating methods.110 Large amounts of 
water and natural gas are also required (for heating) during the extraction process.111 The 
magnitude of the environmental impacts of oil sands production, in absolute terms and compared 
to conventional oil production, has been the subject of numerous, and sometimes conflicting, 
studies and policy papers.112 Some stakeholders who object to oil sands projects oppose the 
Keystone XL pipeline because it expands access to new markets for the oil produced by those 
projects, thereby encouraging what they consider to be further environmentally destructive oil 
sands development. As discussed earlier, however, if oil sands production can be diverted to other 
markets (e.g., Asia), preventing the Keystone XL project may not necessarily limit oil sands 
development.113 
Some stakeholders object to the Keystone XL pipeline because it would increase U.S. supplies of 
oil, and thereby perpetuate the nation’s dependence on imported fossil fuels and increase carbon 
emissions from the transportation sector.114 Acknowledging this concern, in a public forum on 
October 20, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton reportedly remarked that “we’re either going to be 
dependent on dirty oil from the [Persian] Gulf or dirty oil from Canada … until we can get our act 
together as a country and figure out that clean, renewable energy is in both our economic interests 
and the interests of our planet.”115 Critics of the State Department’s draft and supplemental draft 
EIS assert that the environmental review overlooks the pipeline project’s overall impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions, for example, from the extraction and refining processes. To address 
those potential emissions, EPA recommended that the final EIS include discussion of mitigation 
approaches for greenhouse gas emissions from extraction activities that are either currently used 
or could be employed to help lower lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions.116 However, others have 
argued that whether the Keystone XL Pipeline is constructed would have little bearing on 
greenhouse gas emissions as there are likely to be other export routes available for Canadian oil 
sands crude, and therefore, the same crude oils would still be transported and refined, albeit in 
different locations.117 For further analysis of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the 
                                                 
109 For more analysis of oil sands and their environmental impacts, see CRS Report RL34258, North American Oil 
Sands: History of Development, Prospects for the Future, by Marc Humphries.  
110 U.S. Bureau of Land Management, “About Tar Sands,” web page, January 11, 2011, http://ostseis.anl.gov/guide/
tarsands/index.cfm. 
111 Cecilia Jamasmie, “The Challenges and Potential of Canada’s Oil Sands,” Mining, September-October 2010, pp. 7-
8. 
112 For an example of contrasting views, see IHS CERA Inc., Oil Sands, Greenhouse Gases, and US Oil Supply, 
Getting the Numbers Right, 2010; and Natural Resources Defense Council, “Setting the Record Straight: Lifecycle 
Emissions of Tar Sands,” November 2010. 
113 For more analysis of oil sands, including the environmental effects of its extraction, see CRS Report RL34258, 
North American Oil Sands: History of Development, Prospects for the Future, by Marc Humphries. 
114 See, for example: Natural Resources Defense Council, Tar Sands Invasion: How Dirty and Expensive Oil from 
Canada Threatens America’s New Energy Economy, May 2010. 
115 See Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s “Remarks on Innovation and American Leadership to the Commonwealth 
Club,” San Francisco, CA, October 15, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149542.htm. 
116 See EPA’s July 16, 2010, letter to the State Department rating the supplemental EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline 
project, available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/%28PDFView%29/20100126/$file/20100126.PDF. 
Discussion of the analysis of GHG emissions is included on pp. 3-4. 
117 EnSys Energy & Systems 2010, p. 116. 
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Canadian oil sands, see CRS Report R42537, Canadian Oil Sands: Life-Cycle Assessments of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, by Richard K. Lattanzio. 
Land Use and Oil Spill Impacts 
For the pipeline project represented in the August 2011 final EIS, approximately 95% of the land 
affected by pipeline construction and operation was privately owned, with the remaining 5% 
almost equally state and federal land. Private land uses were primarily agricultural—farmers and 
cattle ranchers.  
The pipeline’s construction and continued operation would involve a 50-foot-wide permanent 
right-of-way along the length of the pipeline. Keystone agreed to compensate landowners for 
losses on a case-by-case basis. However, a concern among landowners and communities along 
the route is the potential for their land or water (used for drinking, irrigation, or recreation) to be 
contaminated by an accidental release (spill) of oil. That concern is heightened in areas where the 
pipeline will be located near or would cross water or is in a remote location. 
A primary environmental concern of any oil pipeline is the risk of a spill. In estimating the 
possible impacts of an oil spill, location is generally considered the most important factor—
particularly the potential for the spill to reach surface or groundwater. For example, the potential 
impacts of a spill to water is highlighted in the Keystone XL final EIS, as follows:  
The greatest concern would be a spill in environmentally sensitive areas, such as wetlands, 
flowing streams and rivers, shallow groundwater areas, areas near water intakes for drinking 
water or for commercial/industrial uses, and areas with populations of sensitive wildlife or 
plant species.118  
A release of oil on land would not necessarily result in surface or groundwater contamination. 
The potential for a spill to reach water would depend on factors such its proximity to a water 
source (e.g., on or near a creek or stream or located on land where the groundwater table is close 
to the surface) and the characteristics of the environment into which the crude oil is released (e.g., 
porous underlying soils), and the volume of the spill, the duration of the release, and the viscosity 
and density of the crude oil.  
The size of potential spills and the type of oil that would likely be released from the Keystone XL 
pipeline have been issues of concern to opponents of the project. In its July 16, 2010, comments 
on the draft EIS for the Keystone XL pipeline, EPA expressed particular concern over the 
potential adverse impacts to surface and ground water from pipeline leaks or spills. That concern 
stemmed from two areas—the toxicity of chemical diluents that may be used to allow bitumen to 
be transported by pipeline and the lack of risk assessment for potential “serious or significant 
spills,” including an evaluation of spill response procedures in the wake of such a spill. 
Concerns reflected in EPA’s letter were realized 10 days later when the Enbridge Energy Partners’ 
Alberta Pipeline ruptured near Marshall, MI. The resulting spill released dilbit crude into a 
tributary creek of the Kalamazoo River and traveled approximately 40 miles downstream in the 
Kalamazoo River. Initially estimated by Enbridge as a release of approximately 800,000 gallons 
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of crude, EPA subsequently estimated that over 1.1 million gallons were released. The spill 
resulted in over 220 areas of moderate-to-heavy contamination, including over 200 acres of 
submerged oil on the river bottom and over 300 solidified oil deposits.119 Enbridge estimates that 
cleanup will cost approximately $700 million. 
The Enbridge spill highlighted several issues of concern among environmental groups and 
communities along the pipeline route—in particular, the nature of the dilbit crude likely carried 
by the Keystone XL pipeline. The dilbit crude in the Enbridge spill had been diluted with benzene 
and other hazardous constituents. Following the spill, high levels of benzene in the air prompted 
the issuance of voluntary evacuation of residents in the area. Concern over the presence of 
similarly toxic constituents, particularly the degree to which the level of toxic constituents may be 
unknown at the time of a release, has been an ongoing concern among environmental and 
community groups.  
The Enbridge spill was considered a “very large spill” and not necessarily one that would likely 
occur along the Keystone XL pipeline route. However, in its first year of operation, 
TransCanada’s Keystone pipeline experienced 14 spills. Although mostly minor spills, one spill at 
the Ludden, ND, pump station resulted in the release of 21,000 gallons of oil. Like the Enbridge 
release, that release was first reported by local citizens, not as a result of the Keystone’s release 
detection equipment. These incidents have made pipeline opponents concerned that, absent a 
witness to a spill, a leak in a remote area could potentially go undetected for a long period.  
Also as illustrated in the aftermath of the Enbridge spill, cleanup of bitumen crude presents 
certain challenges. Dilbit is a relatively heavy crude oil mixture compared to other crude oils. In 
general, heavier oils are more persistent and present greater technical challenges in removal after 
a spill compared to lighter oils. Almost two years after the Enbridge spill, cleanup efforts 
continue. Since the spill, public access to 39 miles of the river system was banned to protect 
public health and safety. The first three-mile segment of river reopened to the public on April 27, 
2012. Elements of the cleanup are expected to last until 2015. 
Regardless of design, construction, and safety measures, the Keystone XL pipeline will likely 
have some number of spills over the course of its operating life. The unique oil spill response 
efforts necessary for dilbit crude make an accurate assessment of potential oil spill risk 
particularly relevant when addressing concerns expressed by opponents to the Keystone XL 
pipeline. The need for more conclusive analysis of potential risks associated with the transport of 
dilbit crude was addressed, in part, in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation 
Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90, enacted January 16, 2012). In particular, under Section 16, “Study of 
transportation of diluted bitumen,” the Secretary of Transportation is required to conduct an 
analysis to determine whether there is any increased risk of a release for pipeline facilities 
transporting diluted bitumen. In response to that directive, the PHMSA contracted with the 
National Academy of Sciences to conduct a full and independent study of this topic, which is not 
yet completed. For further analysis of environmental issues associated with the Keystone XL 
project, see CRS Report R42611, Oil Sands and the Keystone XL Pipeline: Background and 
Selected Environmental Issues, coordinated by Jonathan L. Ramseur. 
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Appendix A. Presidential Permitting Authority120 
The executive branch has exercised permitting authority over the construction and operation of 
“pipelines, conveyor belts, and similar facilities for the exportation or importation of petroleum, 
petroleum products” and other products at least since the promulgation of Executive Order 11423 
in 1968.121 Executive Order 13337 amended this authority and the procedures associated with the 
review, but did not substantially alter the exercise of authority or the delegation to the Secretary 
of State in E.O. 11423.122 However, the source of the executive branch’s permitting authority is 
not entirely clear from the text of these Executive Orders. Generally, powers exercised by the 
executive branch are authorized by legislation or are inherent presidential powers based in the 
Constitution. E.O. 11423 makes no mention of any authority, and E.O. 13337 refers only to the 
“Constitution and the Laws of the United States of America, including Section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code.”123 Section 301 simply provides that the President is empowered to delegate 
authority to the head of any department or agency of the executive branch.  
The legitimacy of this permitting authority has been addressed by federal courts. In Sisseton v. 
United States Department of State, the plaintiff Tribes filed suit and asked the court to suspend or 
revoke the Presidential Permit issued under E.O. 13337 for the TransCanada Keystone 
Pipeline.124 The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota found that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they would be unable to prove their injury could be redressed by a 
favorable decision.125 The court determined that even if the plaintiff’s injury could be redressed, 
“the President would be free to disregard the court’s judgment,” as the case concerned the 
President’s “inherent Constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy,” as opposed to statutory 
authority granted to the President by Congress.126  
The court further found that even if the Tribes had standing, the issuance of the Presidential 
Permit was a presidential action, not an agency action subject to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).127 The court stated that the authority to regulate the cross-
border pipeline lies with either Congress or the President.128 The court found that “Congress has 
failed to create a federal regulatory scheme for the construction of oil pipelines, and has delegated 
this authority to the states. Therefore, the President has the sole authority to allow oil pipeline 
border crossings under his inherent constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.”129 The 
                                                 
120 For a more expansive treatment of this topic, see CRS Report R42124, Proposed Keystone XL Pipeline: Legal 
Issues, by Adam Vann, Kristina Alexander, and Kenneth R. Thomas. 
121 Providing for the performance of certain functions heretofore performed by the President with respect to certain 
facilities constructed and maintained on the borders of the United States, 33 Federal Register 11741, August 16, 1968. 
122 Issuance of Permits With Respect to Certain Energy-Related Facilities and Land Transportation Crossings on the 
International Boundaries of the United States, 69 Federal Register 25299, May 5, 2004. 
123 Ibid. 
124 659 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D. S.D. 2009). 
125 Ibid. at 1078. 
126 Ibid. at 1078, 1078 n.5. 
127 See ibid. at 1080-81. 
128 Ibid. at 1081. 
129 Ibid.  
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President could delegate his permitting authority to the U.S. Department of State, but delegation 
did not transform the permit’s issuance into an agency action reviewable under the APA.130 
In Sierra Club v. Clinton,131 the plaintiff Sierra Club challenged the Secretary of State’s decision 
to issue a Presidential Permit authorizing the Alberta Clipper pipeline. Among the plaintiff’s 
claims was an allegation that issuance of the permit was unconstitutional because the President 
had no authority to issue the permits referenced in E.O. 13337 (in this case, for the importation of 
crude oil from Canada via pipeline).132 The defendant responded that the authority to issue 
Presidential Permits for these border-crossing facilities “does not derive from a delegation of 
congressional authority ... but rather from the President’s constitutional authority over foreign 
affairs and his authority as Commander in Chief.”133 The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Minnesota agreed, noting that the defendant’s assertion regarding the source of the President’s 
authority has been “well recognized” in a series of Attorney General opinions, as well as a 2009 
judicial opinion.134 The court also noted that these permits had been issued many times before and 
that “Congress has not attempted to exercise any exclusive authority over the permitting process. 
Congress’s inaction suggests that Congress has accepted the authority of the President to issue 
cross-border permits.”135 Based on the historical recognition of the President’s authority to issue 
these permits and Congress’s implied approval through inaction, the court found the Presidential 
Permit requirement for border facilities constitutional. 
                                                 
130 Ibid. at 1082. 
131 689 F.Supp.2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2010). 
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133 Ibid. 
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Appendix B. Milestones in the Initial NEPA Process  
The NEPA process for TransCanada’s 2008 Presidential Permit application for the Keystone XL 
pipeline project included several significant milestones (summarized in Table 1). These events, 
and resulting documents, will likely have varying degrees of influence over TransCanada’s 2012 
permit application. 
Draft EIS issued 
The State Department released its draft EIS for the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline project for 
public comment on April 16, 2010.136 The draft EIS identified TransCanada’s “preferred 
alternative” for the project as well as other alternatives considered. On July 16, 2010, EPA rated 
the draft EIS “Inadequate.”137 EPA found that potentially significant impacts were not evaluated 
and that the additional information and analysis needed was of such importance that the draft EIS 
would need to be formally revised and again made available for public review. Additional 
criticism of the State Department’s implementation of the NEPA process followed an October 21, 
2010, statement by Secretary Clinton that, while analysis of the project was not complete and a 
final decision had not been made, the State Department was “inclined to” approve the project.138 
Critics of the project, including some Members of Congress, stated that the Secretary’s statement 
appeared to prejudge its permit approval for the pipeline proposal as a foregone conclusion.139  
Supplemental Draft EIS Issued 
The State Department issued a supplemental draft EIS on April 15, 2011. In addition to 
addressing issues associated with EPA’s inadequacy rating, the supplemental draft EIS addressed 
comments received from other agencies and the public. On June 6, 2011, EPA sent a letter to the 
State Department that rated the supplemental draft EIS as having “Insufficient Information” and 
having “Environmental Objections” to the proposed action.140 EPA acknowledged that the State 
Department had “worked diligently” to develop additional information in response to EPA’s 
comments and the large number of other comments on the draft EIS. However, EPA believed that 
additional analysis needed to be included in the final EIS to fully respond to its earlier comments. 
                                                 
136 Documents submitted for the initial 2008 Presidential Permit application have now been archived by the State 
Department. Documents related to that original application are available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/archive/
index.htm. 
137 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s July 16, 2010, letter to the U.S. Department of State commenting on the 
draft EIS for the Keystone XL project is available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/%28PDFView%29/
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138 See Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “Remarks on Innovation and American Leadership to the Commonwealth 
Club,” San Francisco, CA, October 15, 2010, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149542.htm. The 
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which received a Presidential Permit from the State Department in 2009; a State Department spokesman later clarified 
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140 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s June 6, 2011, letter to the U.S. Department of State commenting on the 
supplemental draft EIS for the Keystone XL project is available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oeca/webeis.nsf/
%28PDFView%29/20110125/$file/20110125.PDF?OpenElement.  
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Among other items, EPA recommended that the State Department should do the following: 
improve the analysis of the potential oil spill risks, including additional analysis of other 
reasonable alternatives to the proposed pipeline route; provide additional analysis of potential oil 
spill impacts, health impacts, and environmental justice concerns to communities along the 
pipeline route and adjacent refineries; and improve its characterization of lifecycle greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with Canadian oil sands crude. 
In its June 6 letter to the State Department, EPA refers to agreements with the State Department 
that certain deficiencies identified in the supplemental draft EIS would be addressed in the final 
EIS. Further, in its conclusion, EPA stated that it would carefully review the final EIS to 
determine if it fully reflects those agreements and if measures to mitigate adverse environmental 
impacts are fully evaluated. 
Final EIS Issued 
On August 26, 2011, the State Department issued the final EIS for the proposed Keystone XL 
Pipeline. Among other elements of the final EIS, it identified various major pipeline route 
alternatives and an environmental analyses of potential impacts associated with those 
alternatives.141 
In October 2011, 14 Members of Congress wrote to the State Department’s Office of Inspector 
General requesting an investigation of the department’s handling of the EIS and National Interest 
Determination for the Keystone XL project.142 The request was prompted, in part, by press reports 
suggesting bias or potential conflicts of interest in the State Department’s hiring of an outside 
contractor to perform the EIS and in its communications with the pipeline’s developer, 
TransCanada.143 On November 4, the Inspector General’s Office (IG) announced that, in response 
to this request, it was initiating a special review “to determine to what extent the Department and 
all other parties involved complied with Federal laws and regulations relating to the Keystone XL 
pipeline permit process.”144 On February 9, 2012, the IG released its findings, reporting that the 
State Department “did not violate its role as an unbiased oversight agency,” among other specific 
findings generally supportive of the department’s Keystone XL permit review process.145 
Public Review and National Interest Determination  
Following the release of the Keystone XL project’s final EIS, a review period began to determine 
if the proposed project was in the national interest. As part of the process for the Keystone XL 
project, the State Department held public meetings in each of the six states through which the 
                                                 
141 Environmental analysis associated with pipeline project alternatives is provided in Volumes 1 and 2 of the final EIS.  
142 U.S. Senator Bernard Sanders, et al., Letter to The Honorable Harold W. Geisel, Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of State, October 26, 2011. 
143 See. for example, Elisabeth Rosenthal and Dan Frosch, “Pipeline Review Is Faced with Question of Conflict,” New 
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145 Harold W. Geisel, United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Special Review of the Keystone 
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proposed pipeline would pass and in Washington, DC.146 The meetings were intended to give 
members of the public additional opportunity to voice their opinions on issues they thought 
should be taken into account in determining whether granting or denying the Presidential Permit 
would be in the national interest.147 During the review period, the State Department received input 
from state, local, and tribal officials as well as members of the public. 
After the public review period, the State Department issued a statement regarding the public 
comments and its response to those comments.148 The State Department stated that it received 
comments on a wide range of issues, including the Keystone XL project’s potential impact on 
jobs, pipeline safety, health concerns, the societal impact of the project, and oil extraction in 
Canada. Concern regarding the proposed pipeline route through the Sand Hills area of Nebraska 
was identified as one of the most common issues raised. Comments regarding that pipeline route 
were consistent with the environmental impacts identified in the final EIS with regard to the 
unique combination of characteristics of the Sand Hills region.  
To understand the concerns associated with potential environmental impacts of the construction 
and operation of a pipeline that crosses the Sand Hills (also referred to as the Sandhills), an 
understanding of the unique size and structure of the region is useful. It is a 19,600 square mile 
sand dune formation stabilized by native grasslands that cover 95% of its surface. The surface is 
highly susceptible to wind erosion if the grassland is disturbed.149 Below its surface lie hundreds 
of feet of coarse sand and gravel. Essentially, the porous soil acts like a giant sponge that quickly 
absorbs precipitation, allowing very little to run off. In some areas, the water table reaches the 
land surface—a characteristic that creates lakes that dot the region as well as 1.3 million acres of 
wetlands.  
The Sand Hills sits atop the Ogallala Aquifer—one of the largest aquifer systems in the world.150 
The highly porous soil of the Sand Hills make the area a significant recharge zone in the northern 
region of the Ogallala Aquifer system. That is, the sandy, porous soil of the Sand Hills allows a 
significant amount of surface water to enter (recharge) the aquifer system. Water from the aquifer 
also accounts for a significant amount of water use—78% of the region’s public water, 83% of 
irrigation water in Nebraska, and 30% of water used in the U.S. for irrigation and agriculture. 
In the final EIS, the preferred pipeline route through Nebraska would have been located entirely 
above the Ogallala Aquifer. Potential impacts to the Ogallala Aquifer and the Sand Hills 
identified in the final EIS include potential groundwater contamination after a release (e.g., a spill 
or leak from a hole or damaged portion of the pipeline) of crude oil during the construction or 
operation of the proposed pipeline. Both the soil porosity and the close proximity of groundwater 
                                                 
146 U.S. Department of State press release, “Keystone XL Final Environmental Impact Statement Released; Public 
Meetings Set,” August 26, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/171082.htm. 
147 These additional public meetings are not part of the NEPA process. Considering the strong public interest in the 
pipeline proposal (both opposed and in favor), the public hearings were part of the State Department’s national interest 
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148 U.S. Department of State, November 10, 2011. 
149 For more information, see the Department of the Interior’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service web page on the Sand 
Hills at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pfw/ne/ne4.htm.  
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to the surface increase the potential that a release of oil from the pipeline could contaminate 
groundwater in the region. 
During the public review period, the governor of Nebraska called a special session of the 
legislature to determine if siting legislation could be crafted and passed for pipeline routing in 
Nebraska. Facing the prospect of new state pipeline siting regulations applicable to the Sand 
Hills, together with the concern about the Keystone XL pipeline’s specific “preferred” route, the 
State Department announced that it would require additional information about alternative 
pipeline routes avoiding the environmentally sensitive Sand Hills area in Nebraska before moving 
forward with its National Interest Determination.151 Although the State Department did not decide 
that environmental issues led to a determination that the proposed project was not in the national 
interest, environmental issues identified in the final EIS, and further stressed in public comments, 
led to its decision to delay that determination until it gathered this information.  
Although no new decision deadline was established, State Department officials suggested that it 
would be “reasonable to expect that this process including a public comment period on a 
supplement to the final EIS consistent with NEPA could be completed as early as the first quarter 
of 2013.”152 In a prior press interview, President Obama also appeared to suggest that, 
notwithstanding the delegation of Presidential Permit authority to the State Department, he would 
be personally involved in the final decision on the Keystone XL Pipeline permit application.153 
Directive to the President to Approve or Deny the Permit 
In the wake of the State Department determination that supplemental analysis was needed, 
Congress directed the President to make a determination on the Presidential permit application for 
the Keystone XL pipeline. Specifically, the Temporary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011 
(P.L. 112-78), enacted on December 23, 2011, included provisions requiring the Secretary of State 
to issue a permit for the project within 60 days, unless the President publicly determined the 
project to be not in the national interest.  
Subsequently, the State Department, with the President’s consent, announced that it would deny 
the Keystone XL permit on January 18, 2012. In its announcement the department stated that its 
decision “was predicated on the fact that [P.L. 112-78] ... passed in December does not provide 
sufficient time to obtain the information that we think is necessary to assess whether the project, 
in its current state, is in the national interest.”154 However, the department also stated that its 
decision did not preclude TransCanada from reapplying for a Presidential Permit in the future, 
although such a reapplication “will trigger ... a completely new review process.”155 
As a result of that denial, instead of developing a supplemental EIS incorporating analysis 
applicable to a new pipeline route through Nebraska, a new Presidential permit application 
process will be required. As a result, a “new” NEPA process will be required. Although much of 
                                                 
151 U.S. Department of State, “Keystone XL Pipeline Project Review Process: Decision to Seek Additional 
Information,” Media Note, PRN 2011/1909, Office of the Spokesperson, November 10, 2011. 
152 U.S. Department of State, November 10, 2011. 
153 KETV NewsWatch 7, “Uncut: KETV’s Rob McCartney Interviews President Obama,” Omaha, NE, November 1, 
2011, http://www.ketv.com/video/29652519/detail.html. 
154 U.S. Department of State, January 18, 2012. 
155 Ibid. 
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the analysis and documentation will likely be the same, issuance of a draft and final EIS, and 
corresponding public and agency comment periods, will be required. 
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